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I. INTRODUCTION
As we have witnessed since the beginning of the 1990s, international law,
in particular international criminal justice, can have a significant impact on the
peace process and the reconciliation of societies in post-conflict periods.
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However, debates over peace versus justice, justice versus reconciliation, and
truth versus justice have shaped attempts in the last decades to determine the
controversial place of international criminal justice. This article attempts a
different approach which follows none of the aforementioned concepts and
focuses on the impact that international criminal justice has on ongoing
conflicts. More precisely, the Darfur conflict will serve as a case study to
examine the question whether and how the International Criminal Court (ICC)
can, in addition to offering post bellum justice, also play a more active role to
halt or, at least, to restrain mass atrocities. These opportunities are a new
phenomenon in the field of international law.
The current war in Darfur, unfolding since 2003, has provoked one of the
worst ongoing humanitarian disasters. The international community has been
exceptionally slow to react to the growing crisis; the only stringent collective
measure was the referral of the situation to the ICC by the Security Council on
March 31,2005-a novelty in international law and international relations. For
the first time, the ICC was activated by the Security Council and without the
consent of the respective state. Sudan is a signatory to, but has not ratified the
Rome Statute and consistently rejects ICC jurisdiction over its nationals and
over crimes committed on its territory. As we will see in the first part, it is
probably even more remarkable that the ICC was activated while the conflict
was still going on and far from being resolved. Until now, international
criminal justice mechanisms have usually delivered post bellum justice, and
influencing the conflict itself was never a major issue. However, the ICC is a
permanent institution that is ready to act, thus being able to shift the delivery
of post-conflict justice towards in-conflict justice. As a result of the Security
Council referral, the ICC has the chance to demonstrate that it can have a
significant impact on ongoing conflicts.
The Darfur conflict is characterized by massive violations of international
humanitarian law and international human rights law, which have mainly been
committed by the Sudanese army and a government-sponsored militia, as we
will see in the second part. It is important to understand the roots of the current
conflict as well as the complex issues regarding the different warring parties in
order to examine the potential impact of international criminal justice on the
key players of the conflict.
The victims of the conflict urgently need the support of every international
player that has the potential to end their suffering and help to achieve long-
lasting peace. The ICC is one of these players. The third part examines the role
of the ICC in the conflict, beginning with the activation of the Court and
admissibility issues. The ICC is an active player that can exercise significant
pressure on key players of the conflict, above all on the Sudanese government
and its Darfur policy. Although the ICC should not be dominated by political
issues, this does not mean it cannot have important direct and indirect political
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effects. Potential risks of the ICC involvement, such as endangering the
conclusion of a peace agreement, thus prolonging the conflict, or the
deployment of a peacekeeping mission, also have to be taken into account by
the ICC. It will also be argued that, so far, the activity of the ICC, in particular
the indictments of a member of the Sudanese government and a militia leader,
has had modest, but positive effects on the conflict. In addition to this
evaluation, further steps will be proposed in order to maximize the positive
impact of the ICC activity on the situation in Darfur in the long run.
II. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND ARMED CONFLICTS
A. Tribunals ad hoc providing ex post facto justice
International criminal justice has evolved rapidly since the beginning of
the 1990s. Nearly fifty years after the International Military Tribunals set up
in Nuremberg and Tokyo, which prosecuted crimes committed during World
War II, the international community created judicial bodies to deal with war
crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. The International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was created by a Chapter VII
Security Council resolution in 1993 to face the international crimes committed
during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.' The Security Council followed the
same approach a year later to deal with the genocide in Rwanda by installing
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).2 These two ad hoc
tribunals target specific situations, which are both limited in time and space.
Both tribunals, in particular the ICTY, have produced an important amount of
case law, thus advancing international criminal law significantly. They were,
however, ineffective or else came too late to influence the conflict whilst the
atrocities were being committed. The ICTR was established several months
after the genocidal outbreak in Rwanda. The ICTY was established during the
conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina but did not have the desired impact of
diminishing mass atrocities in the conflict itself. In fact, both tribunals can be
considered a substitute to a more effective involvement of the international
community, such as more stringent diplomatic pressures or military interven-
tion. The tribunals presented themselves as a financially and politically inex-
pensive way of responding to demands of the international community to act.3
1. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 3217th mtg. 2, U.N. Doe. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993).
2. S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 3453rd mtg. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
3. STEVEN D. ROPER & LILtAN A. BARRIA, DESIGNING CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, SOVEREIGNTY AND
INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS IN THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 22 (2006). See also Thomas W. Smith,
Moral Hazard and Humanitarian Law: The International Criminal Court and the Limits of Legalism, 39
INT'L POL. 175, 184 (2002), (discussing the preference of States for tribunals to the detriment of a
peacekeeping or military intervention because of costs).
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The tendency towards implementing international criminal justice
manifested itself in another major step in 1998 when the Rome Statute was
adopted. It established the ICC, which became functional in 2002. Recent
developments in the field of international criminal justice also include the
establishment of so-called hybrid or internationalized tribunals, which are made
up of national and international judges. The Special Court for Sierra Leone
(SCSL) was created in 2002' to deal with the crimes committed during the
brutal civil war; the trial of its most notorious suspect, former Liberian
president Charles Taylor, started in June 2007. In Kosovo, East Timor and
Cambodia, international judges support local courts in delivering international
criminal justice. These and other special mechanisms, such as the Iraq High
Tribunal trying Saddam Hussein and others, have been necessary due to the
facts that the ICC does not have jurisdiction over crimes committed before July
1, 2002, and because several states in war zones, including Iraq, have not
ratified the Rome Statute.
B. Limited effectiveness of ad hoc tribunals
It is difficult to judge the success of the adhoc tribunals, as no generalized
standards exist to measure success or effectiveness.5 Since both the ICTY and
the ICTR were established by the Security Council using its Chapter VII
powers, however, one of the goals of the tribunals must therefore be to restore
international peace and security. The ICTY has been criticized for not fulfilling
these expectations, particularly due to its inability to arrest senior officials
while the conflict was still going on.6 Only eight arrests were made by the end
of 1996. Moreover, most of those who were indicted until 2000 were lower-
rank officials.7
More general critics of prosecutions argue that criminal trials are selective,
politicized, and prevent social and ethnic reconciliation. More specifically, the
ad hoc tribunals have been criticized for not meeting their goals:
4. On the basis of Security Council Resolution 1315, the Secretary General negotiated an
agreement between the United Nations and the government of Sierra Leone to establish the Special Court for
Sierra Leone. S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. SCOR, 4186th mtg., U.N. Doec. S/RES/1315 (Aug. 14, 2000).
5. ROPER & BARRIA, supra note 3, at 83.
6. Hideaki Shinoda, Peace-Building by the Rule of Law: An Examination of Intervention in the
Form of International Tribunals, 7:1 INT'L J. PEACE STUDIES (2002), available at
http://www.gmu.edu/academic/ijps/vol7_l/Shinoda.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2008).
7. ROPER & BARRIA, supra note 3, at 86.
8. Dominic McGoldrick, Legal and Political Significance of a Permanent ICC, in THE
PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 453, 457 (Peter Rowe & Eric
Donnelly eds., 2004).
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Criminal tribunals in places such as Rwanda and the former
Yugoslavia were supposed to bring justice to oppressed peoples.
Instead, they have squandered billions of dollars, failed to advance
human rights, and ignored the wishes of the victims they claim to
respect. It's time to abandon the false hope of international justice.9
The well-known "peace versus justice" debate has been a central issue for
international criminal justice and its critics since the beginning of the 1990s.
The basic argument made by advocates of international criminal justice is that
justice is a necessary element to achieve peace and that justice can only be
accomplished through trials. If domestic judicial systems are unable or unwill-
ing to indict perpetrators, the international community must react. Opponents
of prosecutions argue that indictments complicate peace negotiations and
prolong conflicts and ongoing violence, as amnesties are sometimes a necessary
prerequisite to achieve a peace deal. Moreover, traditional criminal prosecu-
tions are criticized for not acknowledging the particular realities of the different
armed conflicts and not allowing other, allegedly more effective, mechanisms
of holding individuals accountable.
The issue of reconciliation has also shaped the debate over the effective-
ness of international criminal tribunals, reconciliation of war-tom societies
being a necessary precondition for long-term peace. The need to reconcile
Bosnian Serbs, Croats and Muslims was widely recognized when the ICTY was
established.'0 The goal of national reconciliation was even specifically
mentioned in Security Council Resolution 955 and is therefore an integral part
of the ICTRs mandate. Again, the success of the tribunals' contribution to the
reconciliation of Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda as well as the different groups in
Bosnia is difficult to evaluate. It has been argued that the ICTR has exercised
a moderating influence and that revenge killings in the region would have been
far greater without the ICTR."' Promoters of international criminal justice also
argue that trials help to bring about truth, which is necessary for reconciliation.
Others deny that the ICTR has had any significant impact on reducing the
9. Helena Cobban, Think Again: International Courts, FOREIGN POLICY, Mar./Apr. 2006, at 22
[hereinafter Cobban, Think].
10. See Payam Akhavan, The Yugoslav Tribunal at a Crossroads: The Dayton Peace Agreement
and Beyond, 18 HuM. RTS. Q. 259, 264 (1996) [hereinafter Akhavan, Crossroads].
11. Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future
Atrocities, 95 AM. J. INT'LL. 7,23 (2001) [hereinafter Akhavan, Impunity]. See generally MARTHA MINOW,
BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE (1998),
for a more in-depth analysis of trials and truth commission as well as the issues of vengeance and reparations.
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horrors12 or claim that the fragile peace in the Balkans is chiefly a product of
international troops, and not of the ICTY. 3
The effectiveness of international criminal tribunals has been compared
to other mechanisms, such as truth and reconciliation commissions (TRCs),
which were installed in many countries over the last decades with varied
success. They have been combined with amnesties in different forms; blanket
amnesties have been less and less accepted by legal scholars as well as the
international community, while conditional amnesties are still tolerated to a
certain extent. While the most prominent example is South African's Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, the most interesting recent one is the TRC in
Sierra Leone that was installed to complement the SCSL. Helena Cobban, a
scholar and veteranjournalist, concludes that the TRC in South Africa, granting
conditional amnesties, and the absence of any individual accountability in
Mozambique have delivered much better results than, for instance, international
prosecutions in Rwanda. 4 However, it seems difficult to establish a general
rule by linking situations that are hardly comparable. The effects of individual
accountability mechanisms cannot be the same for a post-genocidal society like
Rwanda, where the genocidal outburst lasted a few months, and in South Africa
where a decades-long policy of apartheid was followed by a negotiated regime
change. Furthermore, an isolated assessment of accountability mechanisms in
post-conflict societies can hardly be comprehensive since there are many other
factors that must be considered. In addition to the particularities of every situa-
tion of armed conflict, the broader context, such as the politics of neighboring
countries and the international community as well as the socio-economic
circumstances, must not be overlooked. In general, trials, TRCs and amnesties
are more likely to have a better outcome when supported by political reforms
and a strong institutional system. 5
Another important rationale of international criminal justice is deterrence.
In the history of states, holding criminals individually accountable has been an
efficient and valuable instrument of national jurisdictions to deter future crimes.
Ideally, the same logic would also apply to international criminal tribunals.
Since international criminal justice is in its nascent stage, its credibility is still
emerging. With the establishment of the ICTY, the Security Council wanted
12. Adam Roberts, Implementing the Laws of Wars in Late 20th-Century Conflicts: Part If, 29
SECURrrY DIALOGUE 265, 274 (1998).
13. Cobban, Think, supra note 9, at 22.
14. HELENA COBBAN, AMNESTY AFrER ATROCIY?: HEALING NATIONS AFrER GENOCIDE AND WAR
CRIMES 194 (2007).
15. The paradigm that "trials work best when they are needed least" can be extended to other
mechanisms; weak democratic structures will always lower the positive effects of trials, TRCs and amnesty
programs. See Jack Snyder & Leslie Vinjamuri, Trials and Errors, Principle and Pragmatism in Strategies
of International Justice, 28 INT'L SECuRrrY 5, 20 (2004).
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to send a message to other perpetrators of international crimes that the
international community would no longer tolerate impunity. 6 However, in the
context of large-scale crimes, specific deterrence cannot easily be ascertained. 7
The Srebrenica massacre of an estimated 8,000 Bosniaks at a moment when the
ICTY was already fully operational is a gloomy illustration of the tribunal's
insignificant impact on the ongoing atrocities in Bosnia. Moreover, although
the immediate effect of international criminal justice mechanisms on human
rights violators in other countries is difficult to measure, it also seems evident
that neither the ICTY nor the ICTR have influenced the behavior of political
and military leaders in conflicts in Sierra Leone, Chechnya, East Timor or
Darfur; 8 there is scant evidence for direct deterrent effects of international
prosecutions on future criminals. However, the potential long-term influence
of international trials to discourage future offenders is substantial. John
Prendergast of the International Crisis Group, for instance, argued in the
context of a "peace versus justice" debate regarding the SCSL that "[t]he
precedent of removing an indictment against Taylor would be disastrous for
years to come in encouraging impunity and making a mockery of attempts at
establishing accountability for crimes against humanity throughout the world." 9
According to Payam Akhavan, former legal advisor to the Prosecutor of the
ICTY and ICTR:
[T]he ICTY will help internalize the expectation that individuals,
irrespective oftheir official position, may be held liable for violations
of international humanitarian law.... Over time, this will contribute
significantly to deterrence through the transformation of the political
culture of the former Yugoslavia and the international community as
a whole.2"
It has been argued that the international community should only insist on
holding individuals accountable "if the benefits of accountability over the long
16. Akhavan, Crossroads, supra note 10, at 264.
17. See, e.g., Payam Akhavan, Justice in The Hague, Peace in the Former Yugoslavia? A
Commentary on the United Nations War Crimes Tribunal, 20 HUM. RTs. Q. 737, 748, 750 (1998)
[hereinafter Akhavan, Hague] (emphasizing the contribution of the ICTY to general deterrence, by
transforming the political culture of the international community, over its contribution to specific deterrence).
See also David Wippman, Atrocities, Deterrence, andthe Limits ofInternationalJustice, 23 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 473,476,485-86 (1999) (discussing the problems of both specific and general deterrence in the context
of international criminal justice). For a very critical view that prosecutions do not deter future atrocities, see
Cobban Think, supra note 9.
18. See Snyder & Vinjamuri, supra note 15, at 20. See also, Akhavan, Hague, supra note 17, at
748-49 (focusing on the tribunals' effect on altering the calculations of combatants in conflicts world-wide).
19. Somini Sengupta, Besieged Liberian, N.Y. TIMES, July, 11 2003, at A7.
20. Akhavan, Hague, supra note 17, at 748.
2007]
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law
term are likely to outweigh the costs on the short term of prolonging an ongoing
conflict."21 This decision will, in practice, turn out to be very complicated,
since the "long-term benefits" of deterrence are very difficult to predict and will
often be too abstract for victims suffering in a conflict that could have ended
more quickly without insisting on prosecutions.
Regarding the urgent need to respond to mass atrocities in Bosnia, it must
be concluded that the ICTY was established as a rather illusionary substitute to
a military intervention since "it seemed that the tribunal was more an
instrument for appeasing a troubled conscience that yearned for absolution from
responsibility."22  Even though it furthered international criminal law
significantly by creating an important amount of case law, it had, unfortunately,
only minimal effects on the conflict itself. While its positive impact on
reconciling Balkan's war-torn societies is also controversial, the ICTY has, at
least, stigmatized several war criminals, and thus helped to remove them from
the political scene.23 As for the conflict in Rwanda, the ICTR can be considered
as another rather poor attempt of the international community to set things right
months after the genocidal outburst. One must conclude that the ICTR, due to
its institutional limits, can only provide ex post facto justice, while hoping that
it will have, somehow, a deterrent effect on future genocidaires.
The hybrid tribunals have been trying to bring international justice closer
to the people and increase its immediate effects on respective societies. Even
though these efforts have a considerable potential to positively influence legal
systems in need of international support, thus increasing both the level of
deterrence and the possibility of reconciliation, it is unrealistic to expect that
this type of criminal justice will ever have the potential to influence an ongoing
conflict itself. In addition to the fact that both purely international and hybrid
tribunals are very costly and are therefore unlikely to be installed on a regular
basis, their establishment will always remain time-consuming and dependent
on the political will of various players, including the respective governments
and members of the Security Council. Therefore, expectations that hybrid
tribunals will have an immediate impact on future ongoing conflicts do not
seem realistic.
21. NICK GRONO & CAROLINE FLINTOFT, NEGOTIATING JUSTICE TO UNDERSTAND
ACCOUNTABILITY, BUILDING A FUTURE ON PEACE AND JUSTICE (2001), available at http://www.peace-
justice-conference.info/download/Grono-Flintoft/20expert 0 /o20paper.pdf (last visited Jan. 16, 2008).
22. Akhavan, Hague, supra note 17, at 744; see also Smith, supra note 3, at 185.
23. See Akhavan, Impunity, supra note 1I, at 9.
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C. The imminent capacity of the permanent court to influence ongoing
conflicts
The ICC is special for a number of reasons. First, it is not a tribunal
installed by a Security Council resolution but a treaty-based legal institution.
It is the outcome of an international treaty, which was negotiated and concluded
between states; therefore, its democratic legitimacy cannot seriously be
challenged.24 As a supranational authority, the ICC can also assume jurisdic-
tion over nationals of non-States Parties. 5
Second, the ICC has no proper enforcement mechanisms and must
therefore rely on the cooperation of the States Parties to the Rome Statute.
Contrary to the ICTY and the ICTR, the ICC is not a UN body or sub-organ; it
only concluded a relationship agreement with the UN. As a result, its jurisdic-
tion will usually not be enforced by the Security Council. Moreover, the ICC
does not have direct jurisdiction over the international crimes committed. Since
its jurisdiction is marked by the principle of complementarity, the Court serves
as an "international jurisdictional safety net" 26 which only starts to work when
national jurisdictions are unable or unwilling to deal with the crimes
committed.27 Regarding its global effectiveness, the ICC will have to undergo
a difficult test whether it can create deterrence without the direct ability of
enforcement, as "deterrence depends on the predictable ability to enforce the
law coercively, which often falls short in countries where abuses take place. 28
However, if the ICC activity is triggered through a Security Council referral,
which also obliges the respective state to cooperate with the ICC, the Court
might resume a similar function as the ICTY and the ICTR as a Chapter VII
enforcement organ.
Third, the ICC is also special for its permanent character. Security
Council resolutions or agreements with the governments involved, as it was the
case for the ICTY, the ICTR and the SCSL, are not necessary to trigger ICC
jurisdiction. Specific situations will not have to be dealt with by the establish-
ment of ad hoc tribunals, which have shown to have many political and legal
difficulties,29 are very costly, and, most importantly, in order to have a realistic
impact on an ongoing conflict, take important time to become functional. The
24. KINGSLEY CHIEDU MOGHALU, GLOBAL JUSTICE: THE POLITICS OF WAR CRIMES TRIALS 135
(2006) (arguing that unanimity has never been the basis for democratic legitimacy).
25. Madeline H. Morris, The Politics of War Crimes Trials, in FROM SOVEREIGN IMPUNITY To
INTERNATIONALACCOUNTABILITY: THE SEARCH FORJUSTICE INA WORLD OF STATES 187,189-90 (Ramesh
Thakur & Peter Malcontent eds., 2004).
26. M. CherifBassiouni, The 1CC-Quo Vadis?, 4 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 421,422 (2006).
27. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 17, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
[hereinafter Rome Statute].
28. Snyder&Vinjamuri, supra note 15, at 11-12.
29. See McGoldrick, supra note 8, at 454.
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ICC has, therefore, the potential to shift the delivery of post-conflict justice
towards in-conflict justice. It has a novel capacity to react immediately3" and
influence armed conflicts by stigmatizing those who are most responsible for
war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, while the conflict is still
going on. This approach will mostly target political and military leaders, which
is likely to produce considerable effects on the character of the respective
conflict.
The ICC also adds to the capacity of deterrence of international criminal
justice. The ICC will be far more effective, in a global sense, than ad hoc
tribunals can be in providing a deterrent effect. The ICTY and the ICTR have
shown that the international community cares about international crimes and
wants to end impunity. However, it is unlikely that costly ad hoc tribunals
would be established through Security Council resolutions for every situation
where mass atrocities are being committed. Now, thanks to its permanent
character, an international criminal court exercises a permanent threat for
perpetrators. Because the ICC functions as a court of last resort and exercises
a direct influence on national systems to act, it is realistic to believe that its
mere presence will augment the number of national prosecutions in the future,3'
and thus increase the long-term potential for global deterrence.
Moreover, specific deterrence will probably be at least as important as
deterring perpetrators of future armed conflicts, which has been an important
goal of international criminal justice so far. Now, international criminal justice,
thanks to the Court's permanent character and its capacity to react faster, can
have a deterrent effect on those fighting in the middle of a conflict situation
over which the ICC has assumed jurisdiction. Political and military leaders will
be more careful in their decisions once the Prosecutor's role has switched from
a theoretical threat to a concrete prosecutorial organ.
Besides these unique aspects, the Court already faces similar criticism as
the ad hoc tribunals and finds itself in the middle of a discussion over justice
versus peace, individual accountability mechanisms versus amnesties or
pardons, trials versus TRCs. Targeting political and military leaders of warring
parties unavoidably influences peace negotiations; situations might be
30. See Bassiouni, supra note 26, at 423 (discussing the difficulties for the International Criminal
Court to conduct investigations and prosecutions without delay, on the possibility for the Office of the
Prosecutor to start investigations on its own initiative, pursuant to the Rome Statute, supra, note 27, art.
15(1), is an important asset for the International Criminal Court in order to act politically independent from
the Security Council and states' parties).
31. Peter Barcroft & David Donat Cattin, Parliamentarians for Global Action, A Deterrent
International Criminal Court-The Ultimate Objective (Dec. 6, 2004) (Parliament ofNew Zealand), available
at http://www.pgaction.org/uploadedfiles/deterrent%20paper%/h2Ofor /2ONZpane %20l.pdf(last visited
Jan. 4, 2008). However, the International Criminal Court will have difficulty in building a true threat for
perpetrators worldwide due to its lack of coercive enforcement mechanisms.
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destabilized because of international indictments; these are issues the ICC is
even more susceptible to due to its potential ability to interfere in any ongoing
conflict. A controversial case is northern Uganda, the first situation that was
referred to the ICC. The government of Uganda activated the ICC through an
article 14 referral in December 2003, thus trying to raise awareness on the
international scene about the long-lasting armed conflict between the Lord's
Resistance Army (LRA) 2 and government troops, a conflict which has caused
the death of about 100,000 people in the region and the displacement of up to
two million.33 At the beginning, northern Uganda seemed to be an easy first
case for the ICC; there was no doubt about the LRA leaders' responsibility for
the mass atrocities committed among the civilian population of northern
Uganda. However, the ICC has been criticized since its activation for being the
main obstacle to the peace process. We will see later that, although the nature
of the conflict in northern Uganda and the way of activating the ICC are
radically different from Darfur, many issues regarding the ICC involvement are
comparable in the two situations.
IlI. THE CONFLICT IN DARFUR
A. Origins of the conflict
When it comes to identifying those individuals who are most responsible
for mass crimes committed in Darfur and evaluating the potential impact of the
ICC on them, it is necessary to understand the complexity of the war and the
different warring parties, as well as the origins of the conflict.
The current armed conflict between the government of Sudan (GoS) and
rebel groups in Darfur started in 2003. The Sudan Liberation Army/Movement
(SLA/M) 34 and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) turned against the
GoS, which had continued the British colonial administration's policy of
neglecting the region.35 This deliberate underdevelopment of Darfur had
32. See TIM ALLEN, TRIAL JUSTICE: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE LORD'S
RESISTANCE ARMY 25 (2006) (for the history of the LRA).
33. Press Release, U.N. SCOR, Security Council Presidential Statement Demands Release of
Women, Children by Lord's Resistance Army, Expeditious Conclusion of Peace Process, 5566th mtg., U.N.
Doc SC/8869 (Nov. 16,2006), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8869.doc.htm (last
visited Oct. 21, 2007). Moreover, tens of thousands of children, representing up to eighty-five percent of the
armed forces of the LRA, were abducted and forced to fight for the LRA. See Press Release, International
Criminal Court, Background Information on the Situation in Uganda (Jan. 29, 2004), available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/press/pressreleasesUganda_200401_EN.doc (last visited Jan. 7, 2008).
34. The SLA is the military arm of the political faction SLM. Res Publica, The Darfur Resistance:
Who They Are, What They Want, and What They Need to Create a New Sudan 14 (unpublished manuscript),
http://www.darfurgenocide.org/ResPublicaDarfurTripReport.pdf (last visited January 5, 2008) (discussing
the relationship between the SLA/M and the JEM).
35. Darfur had been an independent sultanate for centuries, before it was annexed to the Anglo-
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already led to tensions before and was particularly criticized during the
devastating, but foreseeable famine of 1984, which cost the life of around
100,000 people.36 Darfur of the late 1990s has been described as an
"increasingly marginalized, violent and frustrated place".
37
In addition to this policy of marginalization, the ever-present cleavage
between farmers and herdsmen, which had largely become equivalent to a
distinction of Africans versus Arabs in the mid-twentieth century, was
increasingly exploited.38 The draughts of the 1970s and 1980s multiplied the
incidents between sedentary agriculturalists and cattle-raising nomads, which
did not, however, necessarily correspond to the Arab-African dichotomy. 39 The
Arab-Islamist GoS added a new dimension to the difference between nomadic
and sedentary lifestyles in Darfur by emphasizing the ideological and racist
definition of "Arab" and zuruq (black) more and more.40 In the late 1980s,
nearly all Arab groups, influenced by this new pro-Arab ideology propagated
by Libya and Khartoum, united themselves to fight the Fur.4' In this time, the
term Janjaweed also came up for the first time, referring to Arab militiamen on
horseback. They are not a popular representation of the Arab tribes in Darfur,42
but can be considered as armed bandits that were tolerated to some extent by
the government because of their Arabic correlation.43
Another aggravating factor was the introduction of automatic weapons in
the 1980s, which gradually buried traditional forms of dispute settlement over
land ownership and access to water wells." The fact that these disputes are
Egyptian Condominium in 1916. See JULIE FLINT & ALEX DE WAAL, DARFUR: A SHORT HISTORY OF A
LONG WAR 12 (2005).
36. GtRARD PRUNIER, DARFUR: THE AMBIGUOUS GENOCIDE 56 (2005) [hereinafter PRUNIER,
AMBIGUOUS].
37. Id. at 81.
38. See Robert 0. Collins, Disaster in Darfur: Historical Overview, in GENOCIDE IN DARFUR:
INVESTIGATING THE ATROcTES IN THE SUDAN 3 (2006) (explaining that these cattle and camel nomads claim
Arab origins and speak Arab, but are ethnically the result ofintertribal marriage with their African neighbors
since their arrival in the 16th and 17th century); see also PRtNIER, AMBIGUOUS, supra note 36, at 5
(emphasizing that the ambivalence is not grounded on biological or cultural reasons, but largely on a different
way of life).
39. JMr6me Tubiana, Le Darfour, un conflit pour la terre? 101 POLITIQUE AFRICAINE 11, 113
(2006).
40. Collins, supra note 38, at 9 (discussing the genealogical constructs of Sudanese "Arabs" and
the "African" identity, the latter being adopted by the SLM/A similar to that of the SPLA, thus reproducing
a polarized discourse); see also RUTH IYOB & GILBERT M. KHADIAGALA, SUDAN: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR
PEACE 31 (2006).
41. Tubiana, supra note 39, at 113. Darfur literally means "land of the Fur."
42. See PRUNIER, AMBIGUOUS, supra note 36, at 97 (comparing the Janjaweed to the Rwandan
Interahamwe, who were not a natural expression of the Hutu in Rwanda either).
43. Id.
44. Collins, supra note 38, at 6. The easy availability of weapons was largely due to the war in
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another major source of the conflict has been viciously exploited by the
government who has been presenting the whole conflict as a low-level inter-
ethnic dispute over land. According to Alex de Waal, a social anthropologist
and one of the most renowned experts of Darfur, the dichotomy between
Africans and Arabs is "historically bogus, but disturbingly powerful".45 In sum,
the facts that members of the two groups have intermarried in the past and that
they are all Muslim and mostly speak Arabic" are strong indicators for a largely
political construction of the Arab-African distinction.
B. Escalation in 2003
In February 2003, the constant, low-level violence suddenly erupted. 7
About three hundred members of the SLA seized the town of Golu, killed two
hundred government soldiers and proclaimed their political demands, the most
important of which were that Khartoum address the uneven development and
socio-economic marginalization of Darfur as well as the separation of religion
and politics.4" The GoS decided to fight the insurrection, hoping that it would
be able to solve the conflict before it could affect the fragile peace process with
the South.49 However, the victories of the SLA in Western Darfur rapidly
showed that the Sudanese army was incompetent and insufficiently prepared.
Moreover, the GoS could not fully rely on its army, largely made up of
Darfurians, to fight its "own" people.
Khartoum responded by rearming the already existing Janjaweedmilitias°
and by recruiting mercenaries from Libya, Chad, and other countries.5'
Although not a new practice, since the GoS increasingly armed Arab tribes and
their militias and disarmed non-Arab tribes with the purpose of intensifying the
southern Sudan and the use of Darfur as a basis for Chadian rebels who, supported by Libya, launched their
attacks from Darfur. See U.N. SCOR, Report of the International Commission ofInquiry on Darfur to the
Secretary-General, delivered to the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council resolution 1564 at 24,
U.N. Doc. S/2005/60 (Sept. 18, 2004), [hereinafter UNCOI].
45. Alex de Waal, Who are the Darfurians? Arab and African Identities, Violence and External
Engagement, in THE HORN OF AFRICA (Social Science Research Council, 2004), available at
http://conconflicts.ssrc.org/homofafrica/dewaal/ (last visited Jan. 4, 2008).
46. Ren6 Lemarchand, Unsimplifying Dafur, 1 GENOCIDE STUDIES & PREVENTION 1, 5 (2006).
47. See Gerard Prunier, Darfur's Sudan Problem, OPEN DEMOCRACY, Sept. 15, 2006,
http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-africa-democracy/darfur-conflict_3909.jsp (last visitied January
5, 2008) (speaking about "undeclared sporadic war").
48. Collins, supra note 38, at 9 (the SLA's manifesto largely resembles the SPLA's vision of a
united, but decentralized Sudan); see also FLINT & DE WAAL, supra note 35, at 82 (claiming that senior SPLA
members coauthored the political declaration of the SLA).
49. PRUNIER, AMBIGUOUS, supra note 36, at 97.
50. See id. (discussing an overview of the origins of the Janjaweed).
51. UNCOI, supra note 44, at 26.
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ethnic divide throughout the 1990s,52 this major sponsorship was decisive in
setting off wide-spread atrocities in Darfur. Janjaweed fighters were partly
incorporated into the Sudanese army through an associated group called the
Popular Defense Force (PDF) 3 They received weapons, official army
uniforms, and were paid and trained by the central government. They have
been described as an "ad hoc unit of Sudan's army."54 Usman Tar, an expert
on African peace studies, explains why the Janjaweed were ready to take up
arms against the insurgents and the civilians in Darfur:
Janjaweed militias have seemingly cashed in on their strategic
positions as agents ofthe Sudanese government, perhaps with the tacit
approval of the latter, to vent their racial/ethnic anger and hatred on
rival African communities with whom they have clashed for decades
over economic resources and ethnic/racial differences.5
It is interesting to note that Khartoum's decision to recruit Arab militias
was not a novelty in its fight in peripheral regions in Sudan. As early as in
1985, Baggara militias, known as Murahaliin, were recruited to fight against
the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and to terrorize civilians
suspected of supporting the SPLA;56 in the 1990s, the GoS armed Arab tribes
to sponsor a brutal ethnic-cleansing campaign in the Nuba Mountains.57
Since the increased level of violence in Darfur, government troops and
Janjaweedmilitias have been fighting the local insurgencies, above all the SLA,
which had grown to a force of approximately 11,000 men in 2005 compared to
a few hundred in 2001.58 The JEM, albeit much smaller, could rely on the
military and political experience of its leaders, some of them having been part
of the central government. 9 Although several ceasefire agreements were
52. ARMIN MEKKI MEDANI, CRIMES AGAINST INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN SUDAN
1989-2000204(2001). For more details on the attacks of Arab militias on hundreds of Masalit villages in
1997 and 1998, see also id at 206.
53. FLINT & DE WAAL, supra note 35, at 102 (the PDF emerged in the 1980s, its members being
associated with the Muslim Brotherhood); see also Pablo Castillo, Rethinking Deterrence: The International
Criminal Court in Sudan, 13 UNISCI DISCUSSION PAPERS 167, 172 (2007).
54. Usman Tar, Counter-Insurgents or Ethnic Vanguards? Civil Militia andState Violence in the
Darfur Region, Western Sudan, in CIVIL MILITIA, AFRICA'S INTRACTABLE SECURITY MENACE? 145 (David
J. Francis ed., 2005).
55. Id.
56. FLINT & DE WAAL, supra note 35, at 24; see also Belachew Gebrewold, Civil Militia and
Militarisation of Society in the Horn of Africa, in CIVIL MILITIA, AFRICA'S INTRACTABLE SECURITY
MENACE? 201 (David J. Francis ed., 2005).
57. LUCIAN NIEMEYER, AFRICA: THE HOLOCAUSTS OF RWANDA AND SUDAN 435 (2006).
58. FLINT & DE WAAL, supra note 35, at 85.
59. See id. at 89, for more information on the two main pillars of the JEM; one being its link to the
Islamist movement, the other its tribal component due to its close relation to the Kobe branch of the Zaghawa.
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negotiated and concluded, the fighting has never stopped. The main issue of the
conflict became the targeting of the civilian population of Darfur by the
Sudanese army and the Janjaweed. The presence of rebels in Darfurian villages
has been irrelevant for the attackers; a general fear that civilians from the Fur,
Zaghawa and Masalit tribes might join the rebels or give them foodstuff and
shelter has resulted in the destruction of hundreds of villages. Numerous
atrocities, including crimes against humanity and war crimes, have been
reported: persecution, murder, rape, intentional attacks on civilians and civilian
property, pillaging, and other crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC6 ° have
led to at least 200,000 deaths and two million displaced persons.6 Because of
these brutal attacks on civilians, the rebels have enjoyed growing support
among the population and had no difficulty in finding new recruits who want
to resist Khartoum.62
60. See generally International Criminal Court, Fourth Report of the Prosecutor of the
International Criminal Court, Mr. Luis Moreno Ocampo, to the UN. Security Council Pursuant to UN. SCR
1593 (2005), delivered to the UN. Security Council, Dec. 14, 2006, available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/library/organs/otp/OTPReportUNSC4-DarfurEnglish.pdf(last visitied January 16, 2008); see also
Martin Mennecke, What's in a Name? Reflections on Using, Not Using, and Overusing the "G-Word, " 2
GENOCIDE STUDIES & PREVENTION 57, 60 (2007). The debate whether genocide is being committed has
become a key question for Western governments and in the Western media to measure the degree of violence
and possibly justify a humanitarian intervention. This debate, however, does not serve the interests of the
hundreds of thousands of victims for whom it makes little difference whether they are being targeting with
genocidal intent or "only" persecuted; it is worth noting that the outcome of crimes against humanity can be
worse than genocide. The rather specific question of the offenders' intent should be solved by a judicial
institution. It has been argued that the "use of the 'G-word' in the Darfur crisis has neither helped galvanize
broad international support for action to stop the killings nor forced the Sudanese government to halt its
campaign of ethnic cleansing." Gareth Evans, the President ofthe International Crisis Group, has argued that
using the term genocide in the Darfur case can be "unproductive, non-productive, and even
counterproductive." DON CHEADLE & JOHN PRENDERGAST, NOT ON OUR WATCH, THE MISSION TO END
GENOCIDE IN DARFUR AND BEYOND 2 (2007). On the genocide debate, see generally William A. Schabas,
Darfur and the 'Odious Scourge': The Commission of Inquiry's Findings on Genocide, 18 LEIDEN J. INT'L
L. 871 (2005); Scott Strauss, Darfur and the Genocide Debate 84 FOREIGN AFF. 123 (2005); Jerry Fowler,
A New Chapter oflrony: The Legal Definition of Genocide and the Implications ofPowell's Determination,
in GENOCIDE IN DARFUR, INVESTIGATING THE ATROCITIES IN THE SUDAN 127 (2006). See William F.S. Miles,
Labeling "Genocide" in Sudan: A Constructionist Analysis of Darfur I GENOCIDE STUDIES & PREVENTION
251 (2006), for social impact of applying the term genocide.
61. Q&A: Sudan's Darfur Conflict, BBC NEWS, Oct. 3, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/
3496731 .stm (last visited Dec. 28, 2007); Q & A: Crisis in Darfur, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, May 4, 2004,
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/05/05/darfur8536.htm (last visited Sept. 18,2007); EntrenchingImpunity,
Government Responsibilityfor International Crimes in Darfur, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (2005), available
at http://hrw.org/reports/2005/darfur1205/darfurl 205webwcover.pdf(last visited Sept. 18,2007) [hereinafter
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Impunity]. The estimated numbers vary a lot. Other sources estimate that up to
400,000 have died. See, e.g., SAVE DARFUR, THE GENOCIDE IN DARFUR-BREFNG PAPER (2007), available
at http://www.savedarfur.org/pages/background (last visited Dec. 28, 2007).
62. Res Publica, supra note 34, at 12.
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Although the GoS hesitates to admit any link with the Janjaweed and
usually labels them "armed bandits,"63 many sources show that the GoS has
been arming, training and funding the militias, as well as coordinating the
attacks on civilians.' Victims describe a typical pattern in which most of the
attacks on their villages have been carried out by the Sudanese army, which
first launches aerial attacks, followed by the militias, who attack the villages on
horseback and camels.65 Recent documents show that the violence, including
indiscriminate and disproportionate air strikes by the GoS, continues without
interruption.66
Because, unfortunately, Arab tribes are often blamed as a whole for the
atrocities committed among Africans, it is important to note that the largest and
most influential Arab tribes in the region, including the Baggara, the Rizeigat, and
the Habbanyia, are not involved in the conflict; they seem to emphasize good
neighborly relations over racial divides, which are, moreover, seldom absolute.67
In addition, it seems that members of the SLA/M do not consider the Arab tribes
as their enemies. 6 Experts have even argued that, "[f]or the people involved, this
is a political, not an ethnic or racial conflict." 9 It must be noted that, while most
Arab tribes have remained neutral, a few originally non-Arab, but arabized groups
joined the side of the government and the Janjaweed, largely because of strategic
reasons.7" Clashes over land between different Arab tribes, in particular in South
Darfur since late 2006, underline the limits of a model of an African/Arab
dichotomy as sole explanation for conflicts in Darfur.7
63. UNCOI, supra note 44, at 37.
64. Id. at 34; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Impunity, supra note 61.
65. See International Criminal Court, Situation in Darfur, the Sudan, Prosecutor's Application
under Article 58(7) 48-49, Feb. 27, 2007, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/cases/ICC-02-05-
56_English.pdf (last visited Jan. 4, 2008).
66. See International Criminal Court, Fifth Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal
Court to the UN Security Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005), delivered to the UN. Security Council,
June 7,2007, available at http'//www.icc-cpi.int/library/organslotp/OTPReportIUNSC5-Darfur-English.pdf
(last visited Jan. 4, 2008).
67. FLINT & DE WAAL, supra note 35, at 124.
68. Res Publica, supra note 34, at 17.
69. Khalid Medani, The Darfur Crisis andthe Challenge ofDemocracy in Sudan, reprinted in THE
CHALLENGE OF DEVELOPMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: CONFLICT RESOLUTION, DEMOCRATIC
GOVERNANCE AND EDUCATION, PAPERS PRESENTED TO McGILL UNIVERSITY CENTRE FOR DEVELOPING-
AREA STUDIES 19 (Monica Trevifto Gonzalez, 2007).
70. Tubiana, supra note 39, at 112.
71. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, AFRICA REPORT No. 125, DARFUR: REVITALISING THE PEACE
PROCESS 13 (Apr. 30, 2007), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfin?id-4769 (last visited
Dec. 28, 2007) [hereinafter ICG, PEACE PROCESS].
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C. The response of the international community72
The initial reaction of the international community to the rising conflict in
Darfur was very slow. The situation in Darfur deteriorated at the same time as
the negotiations between the North and the South came to an important point,
with all eyes of the international community fixed on the peace talks in
Naivasha, Kenya. International negotiators were willing to leave the nascent
crisis in Darfur aside or, at least, to postpone open criticism and more active
involvement, in order to avoid endangering the promising peace process for the
South: "Khartoum effectively held the carrot of peace in front of the noses of
the international community while it wielded the stick in Darfur."73 Gdrard
Prunier, a historian and eminent Darfur specialist, argues that the whole year
of 2003 and the first half of 2004 were lost time for Darfur, because the GoS
knew that "as long as it showed 'good faith' in Naivasha it could do what it
wanted in Darfur.' 74 Western governments and leaders-in particular President
Bush who tried to boost his election campaign by showing his own Christian
electorate that he was acting in behalf of the persecuted Christians in southern
Sudan-were praising themselves for solving the civil war, while Darfur had
to wait for attention. In fact, both the North-South conflict and the Darfur
conflict must be considered in the broader context of a center-periphery
dichotomy in Sudan, with important inequalities between Khartoum and the rest
of the country.7
The situation had already horribly deteriorated in Darfur, when Western
politicians finally started to openly condemn the GoS and its Darfur policy.
Particularly the United States intensified its discourse: the Congress declared
in July 2004 that the first genocide of the 21st century was happening in
Darfur.76 However, the Bush administration, the U.N., and the European Union
72. The Security Council resolutions concerning the ICC will be discussed in more detail below.
73. John Prendergast, Resolving the Three Headed War From Hell in Southern Sudan, Northern
Uganda, andDarfur, 3 WOODROW WILSON INT'L CTR. FOR SCHOLARS AFR. PROGRAM OCCASIONAL PAPER
SERIES 1 (2005).
74. PRUNIER, AMBIGUOUS, supra note 36, at 122; see also FLINT & DE WAAL, supra note 35, at 128.
75. See Gerard Prunier, Nord/Sud La Paix Reste Incertaine, 14 ENJEUX INTERNATIONAUX 28, 29
(2006). Others emphasize the relationship between the elites and their population over a struggle of the
periphery against the center. See Roland Marchal, Le Conflit de Toutes les Ambivalences, 14 ENJEUX
INTERNATIONAUX 34, 37 (2006).
76. President Bush waited three more months before declaring that genocide was happening in
Darfur. See Press Release, The White House, President's Statement on Violence in Darfur, Sudan (Sept. 9,
2004), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/09/20040909-1 0.html (last visited Dec.
28, 2007). The United States has, however, played a very ambiguous role. Although Khartoum's policy in
Darfur has been heavily criticized, the United States has benefited from increasing Sudanese support to fight
international terrorism. This has been suggested as the main reason why the new anti-Al Qaeda ally has not
been seriously challenged. See Res Publica, supra note 34, at 28; Greg Miller & Josh Meyer, US. Relies on
Sudan Despite Condemning It, LOS ANGELES TIMES, June 11, 2007, at 1 (discussing the intelligence
collaboration of the CIA with Sudanese authorities to spy on the Iraqi insurgency and al Qaeda).
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showed themselves more reserved; Jan Egeland, the personal representative of
the U.N. Secretary General, for instance, denounced the atrocities as "ethnic
cleansing." Overall, the international community could not exercise any
coherent pressure on the GoS due to the lack of a unified position. Proposals
for economic sanctions through a Security Council resolution were unrealistic
from the beginning; China would veto any measures that might endanger its
heavy investments in the Sudanese oil industry. Furthermore, both Russia and
China concluded lucrative contracts to sell military equipment to the GoS, thus
representing the most important supplier countries for Sudan.7"
The first measure deserving mention was the adoption of Security Council
resolution 1556 on July 30, 2004, stipulating an arms embargo for the warring
parties in Darfur. The embargo excluded, however, the Sudanese army. The
resolution decided that
All states shall take the necessary measures to prevent the sale or
supply, to all non-governmental entities and individuals, including
the Janjaweed, operating in the states of North Darfur, South Darfur
and West Darfur, by their nationals or from their territories or using
their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms and related materiel of all types
79
This embargo was a first step of the international community to face the
conflict in Darfur, but it overlooked the fact that many Janjaweed fighters were
incorporated in the army or in quasi-military forces, such as the PDF. In
addition to this deficit, a first assessment of the effects of Resolution 1556
shows that the arms embargo has been constantly violated.8"
On March 29, 2005, Security Council Resolution 1591 condemned the
continued violations of the 8 April 2004 N'djamena Ceasefire
Agreement and the 9 November 2004 Abuja Protocols, including air
strikes by the Government of Sudan in December 2004 and January
2005 and rebel attacks on Darfur villages in January 2005, and the
77. Sudan: Envoy Warns ofEthnic Cleansing as Security Council Calls for Ceasefire, U.N. NEWS
CENTRE, Apr. 2,2004, http://www.un.orglapps/news/story.asp?NewslD= 10307&Cr=sudan&Crl= (last visited
Jan. 4, 2008).
78. According to Amnesty International, these weapons, including helicopters and airplanes, were
used to attack civilians in Darfur. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, SUDAN: ARMS CONTINUING TO FUEL
SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN DARFUR 8, 12-14 (May 8, 2007), available at
http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/AFR540192007ENGLISH/$File/AFR5401907.pdf (last visited Jan. 4,
2008).
79. S.C. Res. 1556, U.N. SCOR, 5015th mtg. 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1 556 (Jul. 30,2004) (emphasis
added).
80. The Chairman of the Security Council, Report of the Panel of Experts concerning the Sudan
prepared in accordance with S.C. Res. 1665, 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1665 (Mar. 29, 2006).
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failure of the Government of Sudan to disarm Janjaweed militiamen
and apprehend and bring to justice Janajaweed leaders and their
associates who have carried out human rights and international
humanitarian law violations and other atrocities .... "
Contrary to the United Nations and Western governments, the African
Union (AU) has been directly involved in the conflict since an early stage. This
involvement is praiseworthy, but unfortunately has not proved very effective.
The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), the 7,000 strong personnel
mission in Sudan deployed in Darfur since 2004, was only able to provide very
limited protection to civilians and did not have significant effects on the
conflict itself.
In sum, although the GoS would have the primary responsibility to protect
its citizens against atrocities, the international community has failed to react
and take measures to take the place of the GoS, which is, in fact, the driving
force behind the ethnic cleansing. "The sad reality is that Darfur simply does
not matter enough, and Sudan matters too much, for the international com-
munity to do more to stop the atrocities."82
D. Recent developments
Since the large-scale massacres orchestrated in 2003 and 2004, the nature
of the conflict seems to have shifted towards a chaotic situation, with numerous
rebel groups split up into small fractions83 which are fighting without common
goals due to different political, tribal and individual interests.8 4 The Darfur
Peace Agreement (DPA), concluded in Abuja in May 2006, could not end the
conflict. Weak on the subject of power sharing, 5 the DPA was only signed by
a faction of the SLA led by Minni Minawi; the SLA branch led by Abdel Wahid
Mohamed Nur as well as the JEM refused. These two groups subsequently
formed the National Redemption Front (NRF). To add to the confusion and the
level of violence, the different rebel groups have also been fighting each other;
81. S.C. Res. 1591, U.N. SCOR, 5153rd mtg. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1591 (Mar. 29, 2005).
82. Nick Grono, Briefing-Darfur: The International Community's Failure to Protect 105 AFR.
AFF. 621, 628 (2006).
83. For more information on the splintered groups, see Cdrard Prunier, Darfour, la Chronique d'un
Genocide Ambigu, LE MONDE DIPLOMAT1QUE, Mar. 2007, at 16.
84. REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS, DARFUR: AN INVESTIGATION INTO A TRAGEDY'S FORGOTTEN
ACTORS 6, (April 2007), available at http://www.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/RSFSudanENG.pdf(last visited Jan. 4,
2008).
85. Since the DPA was not supposed to affect the 2005 power sharing agreement between the North
and the South, the DPA gave the Darfurian insurgents only twelve of 450 seats in the national assembly. See
ICG, PEACE PROCESS, supra note 71, at 26-7.
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as early as in October 2005, for instance, several members of the JEM were
killed in an attack of a dissident JEM faction.86
On the one hand, since the Abuj a Peace Agreement, Minni Minawi and its
"SLA-MM" have been fighting against the NRF on the side of the GoS, whose
tactic of dividing the rebel groups seems to be successful.87 Civilians who are
suspected of cooperation with the NRF are now not only suffering under
Janjaweed and army attacks, which are still ongoing in Darfur and which
recently started in Eastern Chad,88 but also under attacks by the SLA-MM.
Rebel groups have added to the crisis by diverting international aid for their
own purposes.89 On the other hand, some Janjaweed fighters appear to have
changed sides and now fight the regular army together with rebel groups,
probably fearing that Khartoum will scapegoat them for the atrocities
committed among civilians and send them to The Hague.9"
IV. THE ROLE OF THE ICC IN THE CONFLICT
A. Expectations after the Security Council referral to the ICC
With Resolution 1564, the Security Council established a Commission of
Inquiry in September 2004 to examine the violations of international
humanitarian law and human rights law in Darfur.9 The commission delivered
a report to the Secretary-General in January 2005, recommending a Security
Council referral to the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP). Surprisingly, because
of the generally negative attitude of the United States and China towards the
ICC,92 the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter,
followed this recommendation on March 31, 2005. Resolution 1593 triggered
ICC jurisdiction for crimes committed in Darfur since July 1, 2002, states that
"the Government of Sudan and all other parties to the conflict in Darfur, shall
cooperate fully with and provide any necessary assistance to the Court and the
Prosecutor . .. [and] urges all States and concerned regional and other
86. REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS, supra note 84, at 6 n. 1.
87. Suliman Baldo, La Paix, Arme de Guerre, 14 ENJEUX INTERNATIONAUX 21, 22 (2006).
88. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 78, at 2.
89. Andrew S. Natsios, Moving Beyond the Sense of Alarm, in GENOCIDE IN DARFUR,
INVESTIGATING THE ATROCITIES IN THE SUDAN 25, 31 (Samuel Totten & Eric Markusen eds., 2006).
90. Alex Perry, Defections in Darfur?, TIME ONLINE, Mar. 21, 2007,
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1601495,00.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2008).
91. S.C. Res. 1564, U.N. SCOR, 5040th mtg. 12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1564 (Sept. 18, 2004).
92. See Zachary D. Kaufman, Justice in Jeopardy: Accountability for the Darfur Atrocities, 16
CRIM. L.F. 343, 345 (2006); see generally Matthew Happold, Darfur, The Security Council, and the
International Criminal Court 55 I.C.L.Q. 226 (2006) (for more information on the political discussion
concerning the Security Council referral, in particular in the United States).
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international organizations to cooperate fully."93 In other words, the Security
Council explicitly obliged the GoS to cooperate with the ICC, but failed to
establish such an obligation for those states which are not parties to the Rome
Statute.
The activation of the ICC through the Security Council can be regarded as
the first and, besides the more recent efforts to deploy a joint U.N.-AU
peacekeeping mission, only major reaction of the international community to
the Darfur crisis. The activity of the ICC has been given much weight in the
case of Darfur, in particular due to the lack of any other concerted measures of
the international community, the dimensions of the conflict and its increasing
mediatization. However, the expectations following the Security Council
referral were mixed; the referral has been criticized for focusing too much on
the future punishment of perpetrators rather than the immediate prevention of
mass atrocities. The possibility of deterring violence in Darfur thanks to the
ICC has been dismissed as a "specious hope."94 A more optimistic view of the
referral to the OTP suggests that the ICC represents a significant threat for key
players of the conflict, being able to pressure the GoS to cut support for the
Janjaweed. Members of the SLA expressed their hope that the ICC would
quickly indict those who they consider responsible for the atrocities committed
in Darfur, in other words senior figures of the Khartoum regime, including
President Omar el-Bashir and Vice-President Ali Osman Taha. It has been
argued that making public the names of the fifty-one individuals, which are on
the list of the Commission of Inquiry, would already stigmatize and de-
legitimize the GoS.95
B. Admissibility under Article 17 of the Rome Statute
As a result of the Security Council referral, the ICC has jurisdiction over
crimes committed in Darfur, although Sudan has not ratified the Rome Statute.
However, specific cases must also be admissible according to the principle of
complementarity, which means that Sudan must either be unable or unwilling
to carry out the investigation and/or prosecution.96 The Sudanese judicial
system can be considered functional from a general point of view. Even though
crimes have been committed on a large scale, it should, nonetheless, not be
93. S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. SCOR, 5158th mtg. 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005).
94. Eric Reeves, Darfur: Genocide Before Our Eyes, in DARFUR: GENOCIDE BEFORE OUR EYES
26,30 (Joyce Apsel ed., 2005).
95. See Res Publica, supra note 34, at 30.
96. Rome Statute, supra note27, art. 17. The principle of complementarity also applies in the case
of a Security Council referral; see Giuliano Turone, Powers and Duties of the Prosecutor, in THE ROME
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 1137, 1142 (Antonio Cassese, Paola
Gaeta & John R.W.D. Jones eds., 2002).
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unable to carry out investigations and prosecutions in the sense of the Rome
Statute. However, the numerous crimes committed in Darfur have been dealt
with by the national court system very insufficiently. The little efforts of the
GoS to tackle the crimes in Darfur, such as through its National Commission
of Inquiry, established in May 2004, and the Special Court for Darfur,
established in June 2005, have had very limited effects. Until recently, only a
few low-level officers had been indicted, and only for crimes less grave than
those that have been committed on a large scale.97 Human rights organizations,
such as Amnesty International, have dismissed the establishment of the Special
Court as a tactic by the GoS to avoid ICC prosecutions.98 The timing of the
establishment of the Special Court, shortly after the OTP announced the
opening of investigations into the situation in Darfur, certainly gives rise to
allegations that it was only set up to try to thwart ICC jurisdiction. However,
since the end of 2006, the Sudanese Ministry of Justice has been committed to
showing more concrete actions; it arrested, for instance, Ali Kushayb, an
important militia leader who is also denounced by the OTP as one of the
persons who is most responsible for the crimes that have been committed.99
However, it is obvious that the judicial system has been unwilling to truly
investigate most of the militia leaders and those members of the GoS who bear
individual responsibility for the atrocities committed in Darfur. Even if
investigations are carried out, it is, furthermore, unlikely that they will fulfill
the requirements of article 17(2)(c) of the Rome Statute that such investigations
be conducted independently and impartially, as well as with the "intent to bring
the person concerned to justice."'00 Generally speaking, it should not be
difficult for the OTP to prove the admissibility of cases concerning the situation
in Darfur; in this case, an activity of the ICC perfectly corresponds to the
purpose of the Rome Statute due to the direct involvement of the GoS and its
97. For instance, for stealing property, see Report of the High-Level Mission on the Situation of
Human Rights in Darfur Pursuant to Human Rights Council Decision S-4/101, Human Rights Council, 4th
Sess., Agenda Item 2, at 18, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/80 (Mar. 9, 2007).
98. Sudan: Judiciary Challenges ICC over Darfur Cases, GLOBAL POLICY FORUM, June 24,2005,
http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/icc/2005/0624collaborate.htm (last visited Dec. 28, 2007); see also
Dawn Yamane Hewett, Sudan's Courts and Complementarity in the Face of Darfur, 31 YALE J. INT'L L.
276, 279 (2006).
99. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, PROSECUTOR'S APPLICATION, supra note 65, at 89.
Regarding the admissibility of the case against Ali Kushayb, the OTP affirmed that its own investigations
and those made by the Sudanese did not relate to the same conduct; see International Criminal Court, Fifth
Report of the Prosecutor, supra note 66, at 8. However, Ali Kushayb was released for lack of evidence in
September 2007. See International Criminal Court, Sixth Report of the Prosecutor of the International
Criminal Court to the UN Security Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005), delivered to the U.N. Security
Council, Dec. 5, 2007, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otpOTP-RP-20071205-UNSC-
ENG.pdf (last visited Jan 5, 2008).
100. Rome Statute, supra note 27, art. 17(2)(c).
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influence on the judicial system. In its application to the Pre-Trial Chamber to
issue summonses to appear against Ahmad Harun, a government official, and
Ali Kushayb, a militia leader, the OTP concluded that the case was admissible,
since the "Sudanese authorities have not investigated or prosecuted the case
which is the subject of the Application."''
C. Effects of the ICC activity on the Darfur conflict
A prelude to future trials before the ICC occurred in April 2006. Security
Council Resolution 1672 named four individuals allegedly responsible for
crimes committed in Darfur and imposed on them travel sanctions, as stipulated
in Security Council Resolution 1591.102 The four individuals were Major
General Gaffar Mohamed Elhassan, a commander of the Sudanese army, the
well-known leader of the Jalul Tribe Musa Hilal, the SLA-commander Adam
Yacub Shant, and Gabril Abdul Kareem Badri, a commander of the National
Movement for Reform and Development. Choosing individuals from the
different warring parties, the Security Council wanted to appear as impartial as
possible, which was a noteworthy step. However, the Security Council did not
target one of the roots of the problems by stigmatizing political leaders, in
particular members of the GoS. Although some feared that the sanctions would
have negative effects on the peace talks, others, such as the United States,
which supported this measure, even argued that it would strengthen the political
and diplomatic process.1"3 In any case, since the adoption of Resolution 1672,
Khartoum's attitude towards Darfur has not changed significantly. Now, the
ICC has the potential to target the key players. The following chapter will
analyze the possible effects of the ICC activity on those players who shape the
ongoing conflict in Darfur.
1. Weaken the government of Sudan
The GoS seems to be a perfect target for the ICC. Since the political
leaders exercise effective control over the army, the violations of international
humanitarian law and human rights law committed by the regular Sudanese
army are directly attributable to government officials. " As individual criminal
101. Fact Sheet, International Criminal Court, The Situation in Darfur, the Sudan (Feb. 27,2007),
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/Iibrary/organs/otp/ICC-OTP-Fact-Sheet-Darfur-20070227-en.pdf (last
visited Jan. 4,2008). The warrants of arrest were issued by the Pre-Trial Chamber two months later, on April
27, 2007.
102. S.C. Res. 1672, U.N. SCOR, 5423rd mtg. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1672 (Apr. 25, 2006).
103. MOGHALU, supra note 24, at 154.
104. This assumption can, however, not be made without the remark that it is one thing to know
pretty well what has been going on, but another one to establish responsibility of superiors and prove beyond
reasonable doubt effective control of superiors over their subordinates.
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responsibility according to article 25 of the Rome Statute is difficult to establish
for senior government officials," 5 the focus will here be on the responsibility
of superiors according to article 28. The President of Sudan, for instance,
exercises de jure authority over the army; according to the 1998 Sudanese
constitution, which was in force until July 2005, the President is "responsible
for the command of the armed forces and other organized forces."' 6 He
remains Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces according to the 2005
Interim National Constitution. '07 Due to the extremely hierarchical political and
military organization in Sudan, defacto control of senior government officials
over the army can also be assumed. '08 Regarding the mental element, according
to article 28(b)(i) of the Rome Statute, a non-military superior is criminally
responsible for crimes committed by subordinates if he "either knew, or
consciously disregarded information which clearly indicated, that the
subordinates were committing or about to commit such crimes." Although the
threshold is higher than for military commanders, it would be enough to prove
that members of the GoS knew about or were willfully blind regarding the
atrocities committed by the Sudanese troops in Darfur. °9
Members of the GoS can also be considered responsible for crimes
committed by the Janjaweed, which is consistent with the concept of control
established by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Tadic: "[i]n order to attribute the
acts of a military or paramilitary group to a State, it must be proved that the
State wields overall control over the group, not only by equipping and financing
the group, but also by coordinating or helping in the general planning of its
military activity."" 0 When attacks are carried outjointly by the Sudanese army
and the militia, the latter are even under the effective control of the GoS, thus
acting as defacto agents of the GoS."'
105. However, contribution to the commission of crimes according to article 25(3)(d) might be
conceivable.
106. CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF SUDAN (1998) art. 42 (Sudan).
107. CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF SUDAN (Draft 2005) pt. 3, ch. I, § 58(f) (Sudan), available at
http://www.sudan.net/govemment/constitution/draftconst/ (last visited Jan. 4, 2008).
108. The ICTY held in the Delalic case that de jure or defacto possession of powers or control over
subordinates was sufficient to qualify a civilian as a superior; see Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic & Hazim Delic,
Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment, 370 (Nov. 16, 1998).
109. For a more profound analysis of the "willfully blind" standard for non-military superiors of the
Rome Statute, see Kai Ambos, Superior Responsibility, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 823, 870 (Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta & John R.W.D. Jones eds.,
2002). The ICC civilian standard is higher than the standard of the ad hoc tribunals. See Greg R. Vetter,
Command Responsibility of Non-Military Superiors in the International Criminal Court (ICC), 25 YALE J.
INT'L L. 89, 123 (2000).
110. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. 1T-94-l -A, Judgment, 131 (July, 15 1999).
111. See UNCOI, supra note 44, at 38.
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Moreover, the GoS is an obstacle to peace due to its political
considerations; peace in Western Sudan might further the creation of a common
political front in Darfur, which would threaten the central government's
reelection in 2009.112 An insecure situation in the West is therefore important
for the political survival of Bashir's National Congress Party. Weakening, if
not overthrowing, the regime in Khartoum seems, at the moment, to be a
prerequisite to lasting peace in Darfur.
Traditionally, regime change has been a necessary precondition to start
prosecutions or other accountability mechanisms. '13 This was the case with the
TRC in South Africa, the ICTR in Rwanda and the hybrid tribunal in Cambodia
to try the Khmer Rouge." 4 The situation in Sudan is radically different. At the
moment, nothing indicates a possible regime change or overthrow of the
Islamist government," 5 which is in power since the 1989 coup. Its position can
even be considered to have been strengthened by the international community's
negotiation strategy to achieve peace for the South, while providing methods
of accountability for government officials seemed to be a less important
concern. l' Despite this political unwillingness of the international community
to exercise a genuine pressure on the GoS for its involvement in the Darfur
conflict, the ICC now has the potential to stigmatize the top leaders. The
effects should not be underestimated, since "stigmatization eventually
contributes to the loss of power and influence on the part of leaders, especially
those who can no longer act as representatives on the international stage."' 7
Ultimately, successful prosecutions could bring about regime change in
Khartoum.
There is evidence that Khartoum and its politics are susceptible to inter-
national actions. In the case of Darfur, the reactions to offers of humanitarian
aid, to the Security Council intervention and to the ICC activity show that the
GoS is far from being indifferent to possible negative consequences of an
112. ICG, PEACE PROCESS, supra note 71, at 15.
113. Rosanna Lipscomb, Restructuring the ICC Framework to Advance Transitional Justice: A
Search for a Permanent Solution in Sudan, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 182, 191 (2006).
114. Although established while the conflict was still going on in Bosnia, the ICTY also delivered
mainly ex post facto justice. Id. at 196-97.
115. One must be careful in labeling the current regime as "Islamist," in particular since the removal
of the leader of the Sudanese Islamist movement, Hassan al Turabi, from official powers in 1999/2000.
Despite this transformation, it is clear that the Sudanese state remains devoted to an Islamist
neofundamentalism. See Alex de Waal & A.H. Abdel Salam, Islamism, State Power andJihad in Sudan, in
ISLAMISM AND ITS ENEMIES IN THE HORN OF AFRICA 71, 113 (Alex de Waal ed., 2004). Therefore, the term
"Islamist" seems appropriate, although the Islamist model of the current government is radically different
from the model of political Islam conceived by Turabi. For more information on the important influence of
Turabi on Sudanese politics in the 1980s and 1990s, see id. at 75.
116. Lipscomb, supra note 113, at 192.
117. Akhavan, The Yugoslav Tribunal, supra note 10, at 272-73.
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international condemnation of the regime. Its discourse was rather marked by
important efforts to avoid such a condemnation." 8 Precedents to the reactions
in the Darfur case underline the effectiveness of international pressure on the
present government. In 1996, a Chapter VII resolution by the Security Council
imposed travel sanctions on members of the GoS and the armed forces and
obliged all countries to "[s]ignificantly reduce the number and the level of the
staff at Sudanese diplomatic missions and consular posts and restrict or control
the movement within their territory of all such staff who remain; ' " in order to
pressure the GoS to surrender the three men suspected of attempting to
assassinate Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak. 20 Although the suspects were
never extradited, these diplomatic sanctions had an immediate impact on the
policy of the GoS, concerning, in particular, its support for terrorists.
Numerous foreign extremists, including Osama bin Laden and dozens of
Egyptian Islamists, were asked to leave the country shortly after Resolution
1054 had been adopted.'' According to Tim Niblock, a specialist of the
politics of the Arab and Islamic worlds, the regime's tendency for ideological
expansionism has also been curtailed as a result of the sanctions.' One can
therefore conclude that actions by the international community, even in the
form of light diplomatic sanctions, could be helpful in the case of Darfur.'23
If international sanctions can influence Khartoum's politics, threats to
indict senior members of the government should do so as well. Khartoum has
shown in the past that its policies are not immune to international actions. Even
though the ICCs potential is therefore extremely valuable, the inability to
apprehend the indicted persons might be the most important obstacle for the
ICC to have any direct effects on both the political and the militia leaders, since
the ICC cannot count on the cooperation of the present regime. Nevertheless,
there is evidence that the indictment of Ahmad Harun, who remains the current
Minister of State for Humanitarian Affairs, has already had effects. Although
118. Castillo, supra note 53, at 175.
119. S.C. Res. 1054, U.N. SCOR, 3660th mtg. 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1054 (Apr. 26, 1996). It is
interesting to note that, probably due to their lightness, the sanctions did not strengthen the regime in
Khartoum, thus standing in sharp contrast to the situations in Iraq and Libya. See TIM NIBLOCK, PARIAH
STATES & SANCTIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, IRAQ, LIBYA, SUDAN 213 (2001).
120. For more information on these sanctions, see NIBLOCK, supra note 119, at 204.
121. Id. at 212.
122. Id. at 217.
123. See DIDAR FAWZY-ROSSANO, LE SOUDAN EN QUESTION 262 (2002), arguing that the
international sanctions did not only provoke the expulsion ofslamist leaders, such as Osama bin Laden, but
also stopped Sudan's project of an international Islamism. For a different, and probably more accurate, view
of the failure of Hassan al Turabi's political Islam in Sudan, see de Waal & Abdel, supra note 115, at 106,
who argue that divisions between Turabi and Bashir were insinuated throughout the 1990s. In short, de Waal
and Abdel describe the split of 1999/2000 between Turabi and Bashir as "entirely self-inflicted" and the
dispute as "simply over power." Id. at 108.
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Harun enjoys a peaceful life in Sudan, it seems possible that he will be
sacrificed by the GoS; "he knows that he may have little time," as an Arab
tribal leader expressed it recently. 24
Furthermore, even without any cooperation of the GoS and without the
option that a multinational force, mandated to arrest indictees, be installed in
Darfur, more subtle effects than mere incapacitation are conceivable. The
activity of the ICC can have an important influence on diminishing support for
the GoS among the Sudanese population. As newspaper articles and editorials
show, critical voices towards the National Congress Party are becoming louder.
A March 18, 2007 editorial in the daily newspaper The Citizen condemned the
support for the Janjaweed and called the GoS "a racist regime that is in many
respects worse than the apartheid regime in South Africa, which at least had the
dignity not to employ rape as a tactic of suppression."' 125 This is an important
development, since the GoS had initially felt powerful enough to suspend
independent newspapers, such as the Arabic-languageAl-Ayam and the English-
language Khartoum Monitor, or to close Al-Jazeera in Sudan after it had
reported the atrocities in Darfur as the first broadcast channel in the world.'
26
By showing the criminal face of the GoS, the ICC can, therefore, significantly
contribute to weakening the regime in Khartoum in the long run and influence
the elections scheduled for 2009.127
Despite this potential pressure that can be exercised by the ICC,
weakening the GoS seems to be a difficult task. In addition to the long-lasting
negotiation strategy of the U.N. to give more emphasis to the peace process in
southern Sudan and the indecisiveness of the international community to tackle
the problem, the strong position of the GoS is due to three mainly internal
factors. Oil revenues secure a permanent income that serves to build up the
army, which is today one of the strongest in the region; there is no viable
internal opposition to the regime; and the central government is protected by the
124. Maggie Farley, War Crimes Suspect Has Free Rein in Darfur, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Aug. 5,
2007, at 1.
125. REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS, supra note 84, at 8.
126. FLINT & DE WAAL, supra note 35, at 115. Unfortunately, arrests of Sudanese editors and
column writers increased in spring 2007, and in May 2007, all media coverage related to the Darfurian rebel
movements was temporarily banned by the GoS. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, AFRICA REPORTNO. 130,
A STRATEGY FOR COMPREHENSIVE PEACE IN SUDAN II n.39 (July 26, 2007), available at
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfn?id=4961&l1 (last visited Jan. 4, 2008).
127. "General elections at all levels of government shall be held no later than the end of the fourth
year of the Interim Period," in other words at the latest in 2009. THE DRAFT CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF
SUDAN, supra note 107, pt. 14, ch. II, § 216. According to experts of the Sudanese political system, the NCP
takes the upcoming elections seriously and already gets ready for an election campaign. The GoS also seems
to acknowledge that a hardline policy will only win the voices of some ofKhartoum's hardliners but not the
elections. Interview with Annette Weber, Researcher, German Institute for International and Security Affairs
(July 3, 2007).
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geographical vastness of the country.12 A military intervention into Darfur, a
territory as large as France, by an international coalition would require
enormous resources.
Security Council Resolution 1593 obliges Sudan to cooperate with the
ICC, but the GoS does not have to fear any stringent consequences of its non-
compliance. It has too many allies in the world that are powerful enough to
prevent the Security Council from taking more decisive actions, and threats of
economic sanctions or a Chapter VII military intervention are, at least under the
current circumstances, not realistic. China and Russia will block any invasive
measures in the Security Council due to economic considerations, while the
Arab League and other traditionally anti-US and anti-Israel organizations and
states support Sudan out of ideological reasons. 2 9 Furthermore, the GoS is
aware that the United States does not have the political and material resources
to launch another major war as long as the engagement in Iraq persists and that
Europeans, not as unified as they could be regarding their foreign policy, are
"not ready to die for Darfur."'3
From a realistic point of view, the ICC cannot be expected to have a major
immediate impact on the position of the GoS in the current circumstances, but
it is more thanjust a symbolic act that can bring Khartoum in need to explain.13'
Members of the government have clearly become more nervous since the
Security Council referral. They fear that some of them might be held
individually accountable for the atrocities committed in Darfur; the possibility
that someone will be surrendered to the ICC is a reality.'32 In sum, the ICC
involvement has the potential to be an important factor in causing change in
GoS policy toward Darfur.
2. Pressure the Sudanese government to cut support for the Janjaweed
If the GoS cannot be targeted directly through the ICC involvement, it can,
however, be incited to change its policy in Darfur. Thanks to the ICC and the
preliminary work of the Commission of Inquiry, crimes committed by the
Sudanese army and the Janjaweed against the Fur, the Masalit and the Zaghawa
have been revealed, documented and made known to the international society.
Khartoum's method of arming and supporting the militias, allowing them to
128. Collins, supra note 38, at 22.
129. In addition to China, Malaysia and India have also heavily invested in the Sudanese oil sector;
see, e.g., Jean-Paul Marthoz, Le Soudan, Pays de Tous les Enjeux, 14 ENJEUX INTERNATIONAUX 13, 14
(2006).
130. [LIes Europ6ens ne sont pas prets A mourir pour le Darfur. Id. at 15.
131. Jochen Stahnke, Erste Kriegsverbrecher benannt, DIE ZErr ONLINE (Feb. 28, 2007),
http://www.zeit.de/online/2007/09/ICC-Darfur (last visited Jan. 4, 2008).
132. Interview of Annette Weber, supra note 127.
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murder, rape, and pillage with guaranteed impunity, has been particularly
criticized. The GoS knows that its Darfur policy is now closely followed by
foreign governments and international NGOs and that it must show some good
will in order to maintain or regain a certain credibility. To save the situation,
or at least to appear in a better light, the GoS is likely to cut its support for the
Janjaweed.
There is evidence that the GoS is susceptible to pressure produced by the
ICC. In the case of northern Uganda, the activity of the OTP increased the
pressure on the GoS to end support for the LRA, which had become an
important ally in its fight against the SPLA in southern Sudan. The conflict
went on largely unnoticed in the world, but the referral to the OTP mobilized
the international community to a certain extent and isolated the LRA. The
International Crisis Group noted in a report in April 2005 that the "ICC has
already had a positive impact on the peace process by sobering the LRA and
influencing Khartoum to reduce support." '133 If the GoS had to change its policy
in the case of the LRA, it puts into question its motivation to continue to
support militias within its own boundaries.
Leaders of the Janjaweed seem to fear now that they will be used as
scapegoats and will be blamed by the GoS as the ones responsible for the
atrocities committed since 2003. At the present time, it does not seem realistic
that Khartoum seriously considers cooperating with the ICC; but should the
government give in to the international pressure and take one step into this
direction, it is conceivable that militia leaders will be "sacrificed" by the GoS.
Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that some militia groups do not
remain loyal to the government and have already started to fight side by side
with the rebels against the Sudanese army.'34
Even though it is encouraging that the activity of the ICC seems to have
its first true effect on the conflict in Darfur, the issue is, however, extremely
complex. Several other factors are at least as important as the ICC threat.
Generally, there is no clear frontline in Darfur; the rebel groups have split, with
some of them developing into armed bandits whose fighting patterns and
attacks on civilians are similar to those of the Janjaweed.135 Many commenta-
tors also doubt that the GoS can still exercise any control over the militia
leaders and believe that the situation has become unmanageable for Khartoum,
133. INTERNATIONAL CRisIs GROUP, AFRICA BRIEFING NO. 23, SHOCK THERAPY FOR NORTHERN
UGANDA'S PEACE PROCESS 5 (Apr. 11, 2005), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=
3366&1=1 (last visited Jan. 4, 2008).
134. PERRY, supra note 90.
135. China Claims Success on Darfur, POWER AND INTEREST NEWS REPORT, Apr. 24, 2007,
http://www.pinr.comlreport.php?ac-viewreport&report-id=643&languageid= I (last visited Jan. 4,2008).
2007]
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law
thus making it impossible to disarm theJanjaweed. '36 Moreover, the decreasing
loyalty of some militia leaders is not really surprising and is not necessarily
linked to the fact that militia leaders are afraid of facing trials in The Hague.
According to Alex de Waal, the economic relationships between Arabs and
non-Arabs have been so close in Western Sudan that, "given enough time they
are likely to make common cause against the government."' 37 Presumptions
that the ICC is the cause for certain actions of the warring parties should,
therefore, be made with awareness of the multifaceted dynamics of the conflict.
3. Bring rebel leaders back to the negotiating table
Even though it is unquestionable that most crimes in Darfur have been
committed by the Sudanese army and the Janjaweed, the conflict is not only
black-and-white. Rebels have reportedly also targeted the civilian population
and looted civilian property,"' as well as attacked and raped aid workers,'39
thus committing war crimes and crimes against humanity. Civilians reportedly
call Minni Minawi's troops "Janjaweed 2."4 The international community has
barely acknowledged this fact. However, one SLA-commander is among the
four individuals against whom travel sanctions were imposed by Security
Council Resolution 1672. There are also speculations that some of the SLA and
JEM leaders are on the sealed list of the Commission of Inquiry. 4'
The leaders of the SLA and the JEM mostly have a different background
than the people they represent. Having lived in cities far away from their
traditional homeland, leaders like Minni Minawi and Abdelwahed Mohamed
Nur were educated in Arabic or English 4 2 or, such as in the case of SLA's most
prominent Masalit commander Khamis Abakir, have lived abroad for many
years. 43  Moreover, JEM's leaders are politically and diplomatically
experienced, since several of them, like Dr Khalil Ibrahim, had been part of the
National Islamic Front government or had been educated in Europe. 1" They
136. See, e.g., FLINT & DE WAAL, supra note 35, at 122. "Forcible disarmament of the Janjaweed
is almost certainly impossible." Id. at 127.
137. Lydia Polgreen, Militia Talks Could Reshape Conflict in Darfur, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2007,
at 11.
138. In early 2005, hundreds of rebels had already shown "abusive behavior." FLINT & DE WAAL,
supra note 35, at 88.
139. Sudan 'Backs UN.-Led Darfur Force,' BBC NEWS, June 18, 2007, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6760781.stm. (last visited Dec. 28, 2007)
140. ICG, PEACE PROCESS, supra note 71, at 8 n.45.
141. According to Flint and de Waal, seven of the fifty-one individuals named are rebel leaders; see
FLINT & DE WAAL, supra note 35, at 132.
142. Tubiana, supra note 39, at 114.
143. FLINT & DE WAAL, supra note 35, at 66.
144. Id. at 91.
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can be considered susceptible to international pressure to negotiate as well as
to pressure from the ICC. Indicting rebel leaders could therefore create a
similar situation as in the case of the LRA, where the activity of the ICC, along
with military pressure, has arguably isolated the LRA and pressured Joseph
Kony and other LRA leaders to come back to the negotiating table. 45 It has
been argued that "[t]he threat of apprehension and prosecution presents the
LRA with clear negative consequences if the peace process fails."'146 Even
though it is clear that the ICC does not want to become a bargaining chip in any
peace negotiations but wants to remain as independent as possible in pursuing
its vocation, its involvement can facilitate the conclusion of a peace deal. In the
case of northern Uganda, prominent NGOs, such as the International Crisis
Group, have pressured the international community to "continue to provide
strong support for prosecution and only consider asking the court to suspend its
activity when and if the LRA leaders begin to implement a fair settlement."' 47
This approach should also guide the attitude of international peace
negotiators towards the rebel leaders in Darfur, despite the factual differences
between the two conflicts. The ICC threat can be a useful incentive in the case
of the Darfurian rebel movements in order to initiate negotiations once again.
Moreover, members of the rebel groups seem to acknowledge the fact that some
of their leaders are likely to be on the list of the Commission of Inquiry and risk
to be indicted by the ICC. SLA members have even expressed their approval
that their leaders accept responsibility for an eventual guilt. 48 Generally, this
is not perceived as an obstacle to peace. The SLA is certain that the crimes
committed by government troops and the Janjaweed are much graver than those
rebel leaders could be responsible for. Under the condition that Janjaweed
leaders are brought to justice in The Hague, SLA members have also expressed
145. Payam Akhavan, The Lord's Resistance Army Case: Uganda's Submission of the First State
Referral to the International Criminal Court, 99 A.J.I.L. 403, 404 (2005). Clearly, the situation in Darfur
is radically different from the LRA case. While the conflict in northern Uganda basically opposes an armed
movement, that has completely lost its popular base and has been terrorizing civilians over the last twenty
years, and the Ugandan army, the Darfurian rebel movements fight for relatively clear defined political goals
against the central government and have been trying to protect the civilian population against attacks from
the Sudanese army and the militias. ICC jurisdiction was also triggered in a different way; in the case of
northern Uganda, the ICC can rely on the cooperation of the Ugandan government, which referred the
situation to the OTP on December 16, 2003. In the case of Darfur, the Security Council triggered ICC
jurisdiction, while the GoS has refused any cooperation. Despite these differences, the effects of the ICC
indictments on LRA leaders are helpful to address the issue in Darfur.
146. INTERNATIONAL Cmisis GROUP, AFRICA REPORT No. 124, NORTHERN UGANDA: SEIZING THE
OPPORTUNITY FOR PEACE 15 (Apr. 26, 2007), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=
4791 (last visited Jan. 5, 2008) [hereinafter ICG, UGANDA]
147. Id.
148. Res Publica, supra note 34, at 31.
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their will to reconcile with the Janjaweed.149 As Abakir expresses it, "[o]ur
problem is not with the Arabs. It is with the government."' 50 Overall, some
rebel factions can, at least for the time being, be considered as a supporting
force for the ICC that is also susceptible to its pressure, since the rebels know
that they are not immune from indictments.
4. Pressure the international community to act
The activity of the ICC also has the potential to make the international
community exercise more coherent pressure on the key players of the conflict
to stop violence and negotiate an agreement. The ICC is a powerful actor for
two reasons. First, since the entry into force of the Rome Statute and the start
of the ICCs practical functioning, the Court has experienced significant
attention by the world media. This interest increased with the first referrals and
the OTPs announcement of its first investigations. When arrest warrants were
issued against Ahmad Harun and Ali Kushayb in February 2007, the world
public was well-informed thanks to the broad coverage of the events. The ICC
is, therefore, a well-known institution whose next steps will be closely
observed. Second, courts in general have a naturally increased authority to
shape public opinion as long as their independence and impartiality are assured.
An international court is, moreover, responsible to the international society as
a whole,' 5 ' which is, in the case of the ICC, represented by the Assembly of
States Parties. The Rome Statute provides different mechanisms to guarantee
the independence of the Court vis-6-vis national governments as well as the
Security Council.'52 For these reasons, findings of the ICC are likely to have
more authoritative power than statements made by national governments or
NGOs. It is a meaningful step if some Western governments or the Inter-
national Crisis Group declare that the GoS is responsible for genocide in
Darfur; it is another one if individuals are singled out by an independent
international prosecutor who is ready to put them on trial in The Hague.
Thanks to this position, the ICC can play an important supportive role in
raising awareness about the responsibility of some individuals for atrocity
crimes and urging the international community to act. Charges by the ICC
cannot easily be dismissed as politicized actions out of ideological reasons
149. Id.
150. FLINT & DE WAAL, supra note 35, at 70.
151. Here, the ICC's backing by 104 States and its goal to reach universal ratification are emphasized
over the fact that several States, including three permanent members of the Security Council, have been
rejecting ICC jurisdiction so far. The ICC is responsible to a large international society and clearly represents
internationalized interests.
152. For instance, independence ofthe judges and of the OTP, as stipulated in articles 40 and 42 of
the Rome Statute. See Rome Statute, supra note 27.
[Vol. 14:1
Kastner
towards certain governments. Stigmatizing those who are mainly responsible
for the atrocities in Darfur, in particular the top of the GoS, through the ICC
would make it more difficult and arguably inevitable for the international
community not to take more stringent measures against the regime. This
indirect impact on an ongoing conflict like in Darfur could be extremely
valuable. An ICC activity is not exclusive to the detriment of more rigorous
diplomatic pressure or even a military intervention; 153 such measures could be
enacted as a consequence of the work of the ICC.
D. Concrete dangers of the ICC activity in the Darfur case
Many international criminal lawyers and human rights groups have been
arguing that international crimes, such as war crimes, crimes against humanity
and genocide, must and can be prevented.
However, a strategy that many such groups favor for achieving this
goal-the prosecution of perpetrators of atrocities according to
universal standards-risks causing more atrocities than it would
prevent, because it pays insufficient attention to political realities.154
The following chapter will address those facets of the ICC involvement
that may prolong the conflict and aggravate the humanitarian situation of the
victims.
1. Fewer prospects of a peace agreement-
the ICC prolonging the conflict
"The pursuit of criminals is one thing. Making peace is another."'' 55
One of the major problems in Darfur is that the conflict has had disastrous
consequences on the humanitarian situation. In addition to the fact that around
2.5 million Darfurians live in refugee camps in Western Sudan and Eastern
Chad, around six million people depend on food aid. Although the conflict has
fortunately lost its characteristic of mass atrocities committed in 2003 and 2004
by the Janjaweed and the Sudanese Army, the effects of the lasting conflict on
the civilian population are not less invasive.
153. The debate whether or not a military intervention would be helpful has split in particular French
NGOs trying to find solutions to end the conflict; while organizations like Urgence Darfour fight vigorously
for a military option, spokespersons of Midecins Sans Fronti~res, for instance, affirm that a military
intervention would aggravate the conflict. See Agnes Gruda, Le Darfour n est pas le Rwanda, LA PRESSE,
Apr. 13, 2007.
154. Snyder & Vinjamuri, supra note 15, at 5.
155. Anonymous, Human Rights in Peace Negotiations, 18:2 HUM. RTs. Q. 249, 258 (1996).
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It is obvious that an inclusive peace agreement is urgently needed to
increase the probability of stopping violence; the mere fact that the level of
violence has decreased does not save Darfurians from starving to death.
Security cannot be reestablished in the region without disarmament of both the
militias and the different rebel groups, which would ideally be accompanied by
the retreat of the Sudanese army and the deployment of a multi-national force.
An agreement between the warring parties is an essential prerequisite for peace
and also for some form of power sharing 6 la Naivasha, although the GoS
would have difficulties to justify another "defeat;" promising any form of
political influence to the rebels in addition to the North-South accord would be
rejected by Khartoum's hardliners. One major problem is that it does not seem
realistic to assume that any of those who are or will be indicted by the ICC
could play an important role in peace negotiations or be part of a new
government. As a result, it has been argued that indicting leaders "would only
increase the incentive to ramp up the attacks and force a final resolution by
eliminating the enemy."' 56 Furthermore, by portraying the ICC as an obstacle
to peace, Khartoum is trying to make the ICC a bargaining chip in future peace
negotiations. 57
It has often been argued that amnesty deals are a necessary element in
peace negotiations. Governments have used this tool in order to raise the
probability of stopping an ongoing conflict or to secure the transition from a
dictatorial regime to a democratic rule of law. The argument is that the
prospect of prosecution only creates a "nothing-to-lose" attitude among the
leaders of belligerent groups, with the result that conflicts last longer than they
would have to. Spokespersons of peace initiatives in northern Uganda, for
instance, have broadly condemned the "interference" of the ICC. They fear that
peace will be even more difficult to reach: "[o]bviously, nobody can convince
the leaders of a rebel movement to come to the negotiating table and at the same
time tell them that they will appear in courts to be prosecuted."'' 8 Furthermore,
the LRA is well-known for committing revenge massacres among the civilian
population for alleged cooperation with the Ugandan government.'59 As a
result, many commentators and peace organizations condemned the referral to
the ICC and argued that an unconditional amnesty for Joseph Kony and other
156. Trying Times in Darfur and the Establishment of International Criminal Law, POWER AND
INTEREST NEWS REPORT, Mar, 4, 2005, available at http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=viewreport&
reportid=275&languageid=I (last visited Jan. 8, 2008).
157. Nick Grono & David Mozersky, Sudan and the ICC: A Question of Accountability,
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, Jan. 31, 2007, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cftn?id=4640&1=1
(last visited Jan. 8, 2008).
158. Adam Branch, International Justice, Local Injustice, DISSENT MAGAZINE (Summer 2004),
available at http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=336 (last visited January 16, 2008).
159. ALLEN, supra note 32, at 103.
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LRA commanders would be an indispensable requirement for peace
negotiations and therefore the only possibility for bringing peace to northern
Uganda. 6° Even the government of Uganda itself, having referred the situation
to the ICC to raise international awareness about the conflict on the inter-
national scene, has been trying to convince the OTP to suspend the indictments
in order to enable a peace deal and traditional forms of reconciliation.' 6 '
Achieving peace in northern Uganda and in Darfur will not be possible
through the same means. The frontlines in northern Uganda where relatively
promising peace negotiations were made in 2006 are clear; the LRA versus
President Museveni's government. Negotiations are marked by clear bargain-
ing chips, such as amnesty for members of the LRA. Compared to this long-
lasting duel, the situation in Darfur is chaotic. The Abuja peace agreement
must be considered to have failed; a completely new process, which brings
together the GoS, the numerous rebel groups, as well as militia leaders, will be
necessary. Clearly, there is still a long way to go. For these reasons, ICC
indictments will not affect peace negotiations in the same way as in northern
Uganda. However, the basic assumption remains valid; negotiating peace with
individuals who are facing trials is a problematical matter. Possible prosecu-
tions are likely to represent an obstacle to a peace deal. In the case of Darfur,
if the OTP continues a consistent policy, precisely those individuals that will
be needed to settle the conflict can be expected to be targeted by the OTP:
government officials as well as leaders of rebel groups and the Janjaweed.
2. Endanger the deployment of a U.N. peacekeeping force
The humanitarian situation in Darfur has been deteriorating drastically
since the outbreak of protracted violence in 2003; humanitarian relief is badly
needed. Numerous NGOs operating in the area had to pull out or limit their
activities due to security concerns. 62 Although a U.N. mission would not solve
160. See, e.g., Branch, supra note 158. Di Giovanni comes to the conclusion that, "[t]hrough
prosecution or eventual reparations, the Court could threaten any transitional justice process in Uganda by
playing into the government's political strategies." Adrian Di Giovanni, The Prospect ofICC Reparations
in the Case Concerning Northern Uganda: On a Collision Course with Incoherence?, 2 J. INT'L LAW &
INT'L REL. 25, 62 (2006).
161. UGANDA: Locals Want Rebel Leader Forgiven, IRIN, Dec. 7, 2006, http://www.irinnews.
org/report.aspx?reportid=59805 (last visited Jan. 8, 2008); see also Peace or Justice?, GUARDIAN WEEKLY,
Jan. 10, 2007, available at http'//www.guardian.co.uk/guardianweekly/story/0,, 1987173,00.html (last visited
Jan. 8, 2008).
162. A cause de l'inscuritg, des zones inaccessibles, des personnes sans assistance, MfDECINS
SANS FROwItRES, Oct. 25, 2006, http://www.msf.fr/site/actu.nsf/actus/darfouritvjs251006 (last visited Jan.
8, 2008). Oxfam announced in June 2007 that it would withdraw permanently from Gereida due to security
concerns. See Sudan 'Backs UN Led Darfur Force, ' supra note 139.
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the problem immediately,'63 it would certainly improve security significantly
through its presence in buffer zones and internally displaced persons camps.
Although the international community did not react as quickly as it should have,
there is now a broad international consensus that the 7,000 troops of the African
Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), which cannot cope with the situation,16
should be supplemented by a stronger U.N. mission. As a result, the Security
Council decided in August 2006 that the United Nations Mission in Sudan
(UNMIS) shall be strengthened by up to 20,000 troops and its mandate be
extended from southern Sudan to Darfur. 165 The GoS, however, blocked the
deployment of a U.N. mission or even a combined U.N.-AU mission. In June
2007, Khartoum started to show more willingness to admit a hybrid U.N.-AU
peacekeeping force for Darfur, which was authorized by the Security Council
on July 31, 2007.166 While this is an important step, diplomats remain skeptic
due to the frequent policy of the GoS not to keep its promises. Moreover,
experts affirm that a deployment would not take place before 2008.167
One should thus question why the GoS has been so reluctant to admit a
U.N. force into Darfur, considering the fact that there is already a U.N. mission
in southern Sudan. One issue is Khartoum's fear that a U.N. mission in Darfur
would cooperate with the ICC, for instance by arresting members of its armed
forces and transferring them to The Hague. 68 Strongly opposing the ICC, the
GoS objects, therefore, to any means which might potentially support the OTP's
activity. Although there is no empirical evidence that a U.N. mission would
really arrest persons wanted by the ICC, the OTP already showed that it takes
advantage from a U.N. mission on the ground. To pursue investigations in the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the OTP affirmed that it relied heavily
on the cooperation of the U.N. mission in the DRC (MONUC), in particular due
to the security situation. Logistical assistance, such as flight transportation, has
also been essential. "And while we are striving to become as autonomous as
possible in the circumstances, in some areas we will simply not be able to
163. According to M~decins Sans Fronti&es, one ofthe major NGOs operating in Darfur, a military
intervention would face many difficulties, because any foreign troops would have to fight against the
Sudanese army; due to the current position of the GoS, the situation would be hardly different for a U.N.
mission. See De Mauvaises Reponses t de Bonnes Questions, MEDECINS SANS FRONTlItRES, Mar. 23, 2007,
http://www.msf.fr/sitelactu.nsf/actus/darfouritwgab230307 (last visited Jan. 8, 2008).
164. For more information, see CENTER OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, ANNUAL REVIEW OF
GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS 37 (2006). For the role of the African Union in Darfur, see Jeremy I. Levitt,
The Peace and Security Council of the African Union and the United Nations Security Council: The Case
ofDarfur, Sudan, in THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE USE OF FORCE, THEORY AND REALITY-A NEED FOR
CHANGE? 213, 240 (Niels Blokker & Nico Schrijver eds., 2005).
165. S.C. Res. 1706, U.N. SCOR, 5519th mtg. 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1706 (Aug. 31, 2006).
166. S.C. Res. 1769, U.N. SCOR, 5727th mtg. i, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1769 (July 31, 2007).
167. Sudan 'Backs U.N.-Led Darfur Force, 'supra note 139.
168. Le Soudan rejette la ldgitimit de la CPIsur le Darfour, LE MONDE, Feb. 27, 2007.
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operate without such support." 169 Moreover, attempts have been made by the
Ugandan government in mid-2006 to carry out a joint operation between the
Congolese and MONUC in order to execute the arrest warrants against the
leaders of the LRA, 171 which is now believed to be based in the northeast of the
DRC.17' Even if such cooperation is unlikely at the moment, the possibility that
MONUC or UNMIS will play a considerable role in apprehending Joseph Kony
and his allies still exists.
The missions in Bosnia and Liberia are good examples to show that
peacekeeping forces can be important players to deliver war criminals to
international tribunals. With Resolution 1638, adopted unanimously, the
Security Council took an important step to reform U.N. practice by expanding
the mandate of the U.N. mission in Liberia (UNMIL) to "apprehend and detain
former President Charles Taylor in the event of a return to Liberia and to
transfer him or facilitate his transfer to Sierra Leone for prosecution before the
Special Court for Sierra Leone." '172 Charles Taylor was subsequently arrested
by Nigerian officials, when he tried to flee Nigeria in March 2006; after Taylor
had been repatriated to Liberia, U.N. peacekeepers transferred him to
Freetown.173  With this new policy, the Security Council underlined the
importance of fighting impunity, extending the means to do so by Resolution
1638.
After the establishment of the tribunals for ex-Yugoslavia and Rwanda as
well as the support for other bodies, such as the SCSL, the Security Council,
therefore, made further efforts to sponsor international criminal justice, in the
case of Resolution 1638 on the level of enforcement. The non-coercive nature
of the peacekeeping force is not an obstacle, in particular if the host government
approves the extension of the mission's mandate; Resolution 163 8 did not shift
UNMIL towards a peace-enforcement mission.'74 However, if the Liberian
government had not given its consent, the task, which arguably amounts to a
duty, 175 to apprehend Taylor could hardly have been reconciled with the
mandate of a peacekeeping force.
169. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Informal Meeting of
Legal Advisors of Ministries of Foreign Affairs (Oct. 24, 2005), available at www.icc-
cpi.int/library/organs/otp/speeches/LMO_20051024 English.pdf (last visted Jan. 8, 2008).
170. See ICG, UGANDA, supra note 146, at 7.
171. Id. at 8.
172. S.C. Res. 1638, U.N. SCOR, 5304th mtg. 1 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1638 (Nov. 11, 2005). The
mission in Somalia, UNOSOM IL was given a similar mandate. For more information, see Micaela Frulli,
A Turning Point in International Efforts to Apprehend War Criminals, The UN. Mandates Taylor's Arrest
in Liberia, 4 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 351, 352 (2006).
173. Frulli, supra note 172, at 351.
174. Id. at 359.
175. In the wording of Security Council Resolution 1638, the mandate "shall include." See S.C. Res.
1638, U.N. SCOR, 5304th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1638 (2005).
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The NATO-led force (IFOR/SFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina did not receive
an explicit authorization by the Security Council to apprehend war crimes
suspects, but it is mandated to ensure the implementation of the Dayton Peace
Accord, including the clause that the parties must cooperate with the ICTY.
One can therefore conclude that, by arresting indictees, the international force
only enforces compliance with the Peace Accord.' The North Atlantic
Council, using non-mandatory language, specified that "IFOR should detain any
persons indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal who come into contact
with IFOR in its execution of assigned tasks, in order to assure the transfer of
these persons to the International Criminal Tribunal,"' 77 thus expressly
mandating the multinational force to execute arrest warrants issued by the
ICTY. Indeed, several indictees were subsequently arrested and transferred to
The Hague by SFOR.
In sum, the fact that peacekeeping forces in Liberia and Bosnia played a
substantial role in arresting war criminals is an important development towards
the enforcement of international criminal law. In the case of Darfur, it has been
argued that the GoS had been opposed to a peacekeeping force in Darfur long
before the referral to the ICC, since it is "determined to wipe out the rebel
groups in Darfur, at almost any cost.' 178 It is also evident that, similar to
UNMIS, the mandate of a peacekeeping mission would be limited to a clearly
defined region and would not include the arrest of government officials.
79
However, as the case of Liberia has shown, mandates can be extended once a
force is on the ground; a general tendency towards implementing international
law, including international criminal law, seems to be emerging. Even if
executing ICC arrest warrants would not be one of the primary tasks of a
peacekeeping force in Darfur, international forces, as evidenced in the cases of
Liberia and Bosnia, are increasingly sought to cooperate with international
criminal tribunals.
Moreover, in the case of Darfur, the OTP has already shown that peace-
keeping troops on the ground are considered an important source of information
for its investigations. In its reports to the Security Council, Luis Moreno-
176. For a further discussion on this controversial point and the question whether the multinational
force is obliged to execute arrest warrants, see Paula Gaeta, Is NA TOA uthorizedor Obligedto Arrest Persons
Indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia?, 9 E.J.I.L. 174 (1998). On the
difficult relationship between the ICTY and IFOR, see GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF
VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS OF WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS 251 (2000).
177. Gaeta, supra note 176, at 3. To facilitate the arrest of indictees by the peacekeeping force, the
ICTY amended its Rules of Procedure and Evidence in 1996 by adopting Rule 59, allowing the ICTY to
transmit a warrant of arrest to an "appropriate authority or international body." See Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, 1994 ICTY 59.
178. See GRONO & MOZERSKY, supra note 157.
179. See id.
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Ocampo revealed that contacts with AMIS had been made and underlined the
importance of expeditious assistance of the AU to the work of the OTP. 8 ° A
possible cooperation of a U.N. mission with the ICC is also on the table.
Prominent NGOs, such as Human Rights Watch and the International Crisis
Group, have openly pressured the Security Council to explicitly mandate a U.N.
peacekeeping mission to support the work of the ICC in Darfur: "The mission
should also be specifically empowered to provide appropriate assistance to the
International Criminal Court's investigations in Darfur including the arrest of
individuals indicted for crimes against humanity and war crimes."'
181
Whether or not Khartoum's fear that a U.N. mission in Darfur might start
to arrest members of the Sudanese army and the militias is justified, there is a
realistic possibility that a U.N. mission would at least facilitate the work of the
OTP on the ground, as it has been the case in the DRC. Due to this scenario,
the ICC has not been a supporting factor in persuading the GoS to approve a
U.N. mission for Darfur.
E. Evaluation and suggested further proceedings
The two important dangers of the ICC activity in the Darfur conflict must
be considered seriously, although they should not fuel doubts neither on the
involvement itself nor the ICC as an institution. However, the potentially
negative impact of indictments and arrest warrants must not be ignored but
rather clearly addressed. Being an obstacle to a peace agreement or the
deployment of a peacekeeping mission are serious challenges.
The example of Darfur underlines the validity of the premise that peace
and justice do not have to contradict each other and are not mutually exclusive
concepts. Since the ICC entered the scene when a reliable peace process was
still out of sight, its potential to pressure key players to change their policy and
attitude are much more important than the risk that peace negotiations are, in
the end, prolonged because the question of individual accountability must be
addressed. In other words, the ICC is a player that can help to bring about
peace through profounder means than what the "peace versus justice" debate
can offer.
180. International Criminal Court, Second Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal
Court to the UN. Security Council Pursuant to UN. SCR 1593, delivered to the Security Council, Dec. 13,
2005, available athttp://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/LMOUNSC_ReportBEn.pdf (last visited Jan.
8, 2008).
181. Letter from Gareth Evans & Kenneth Roth to Members of the U.N. Security Council Regarding
Darfur (Jan. 31,2006), in Security Council Must Take Action to Protect Civilians in Darfur, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH & INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/01/31/
sudan12577.htm (last visited Jan. 8, 2008)
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For these reasons, the above-mentioned prospects of the ICC involvement
in the Darfur conflict, in particular the potential to make the GoS change its
policy in Darfur, clearly outweigh the dangers that come with international
indictments. Even if indicting government officials is always a delicate matter,
since their cooperation is essential to deal with the humanitarian situation and
the resolution of the conflict, government officials should not be shielded
against prosecutions. Since the negative impact for the victims of the conflict
is potentially more serious when the actors still in power are targeted, evidence
must be carefully collected. The more risky a case is from a political point of
view, the stronger is has to be. If there are "reasonable grounds to believe"'82
that the top of the Sudanese government is responsible for crimes committed
within the jurisdiction of the ICC, which means in concreto that, besides
individual criminal responsibility, superior responsibility can be established by
the Prosecutor according to article 28(b) of the Rome Statute, then the OTP and
the Pre-Trial-Chamber should not restrain themselves from taking similar steps,
as in the case of Harun and Kushayb. The prospect of weakening the GoS
outweighs the risk that the subsequent lack of cooperation of the GoS with
international players will aggravate the situation of Darfurians.
In any case, it is important that the ICC remains impartial and, equally
important, that it also appears impartial in the eyes of the warring parties.
Otherwise, the ICC will be considered as an instrument of one party, which was
only activated to abet the party's victory, if not in the battlefield, then in the
courtroom. The danger of becoming a political instrument exists; in the case
of northern Uganda, the ICC has been harshly criticized and branded as a tool
of President Museveni to exercise political pressure. The activation of the ICC
by the Ugandan government itself, which has a strong interest in putting as
much pressure as possible on its military opponents, stands in sharp contrast to
the situation in Darfur. Nonetheless, the ICC also risks being criticized as a
political instrument regarding its involvement in the Darfur conflict. It has been
argued that, through the Darfur referral, the Security Council "took the risk to
confuse the juridical order with political tactic."' 83 The question is how the
ICC can show its willingness and capability to act independently and
impartially in Darfur and emphasize that it is not a mere instrument of Western
governments to exercise pressure on the generally unloved Islamist GoS.
One possibility to face this challenge is the "initial proportion" strategy,"'
a pragmatic approach that takes into account the political effects of indictments.
According to this strategy, the prosecutor should start by selecting a similar
182. Rome Statute, supra note 27, art. 58(1)(a).
183. Marchal, supra note 75, at 36.
184. A strategy proposed by Aleksandar Fati6 in the context of the ICTY. See ALEKSANDAR FATI(t,
RECONCILIATION VIA THE WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL? 84 (2000).
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amount of individuals of the various warring parties in order to avoid appearing
partial. Once a settlement of the conflict is reached and another outbreak of
violence is unlikely, the prosecutor will be able to do his work more freely at
lower political risks. Applied to the Darfur conflict, the OTP should not only
target the Haruns and Kushaybs, but also rebel leaders. Thanks to the large
prosecutorial discretion and due to the substantial violations of international
humanitarian law by various rebel groups, the question of sufficient gravity is
not an obstacle. If the OTP pursues a consistent procedure, at least one or two
leaders of rebel groups should be targeted next. This would also facilitate a
rectification of the perception of the conflict which is largely still reduced to an
oversimplifying black-and-white offenders-victims scheme in the world
opinion. The OTP would have to maintain this equilibrium as long as necessary
in order not to appear as an instrument of one side. Subsequently, the OTP
could return to a policy that is marked by article 17(1)(d) considerations and the
preamble of the Rome Statute; in other words it could then set up a clear list of
those who are allegedly most responsible for the worst crimes committed in
Darfur, regardless of their affiliation with a certain group.
It is important to mention that the ICC, besides the problem of enforce-
ment, is limited in its possible impact on ending the Darfur conflict due to
another factor: time. The question of time is decisive because the ICC could
have even more immediate effects on an ongoing conflict if it could react faster.
Clearly, political considerations must not be disregarded; rushing into indict-
ments is not advisable. The question of the right timing in order to exercise a
genuine threat while minimizing potential political risks will always be crucial.
It would not make sense to release the decision of numerous indictments of
central political figures when an important peace agreement is about to be
concluded; or to scare Darfurian rebel leaders with indictments when long-
awaited negotiations to unite the splintered rebel groups, which would be a first
fundamental step to refuel the peace process, come to a critical point. The
ICC's commitment to bringing perpetrators of international crimes to justice
does not hold the OTP back from postponing the publication of indictments a
few weeks or months in order to show itself politically sensitive and in line with
the requirement of acting in accordance with the "interests of the victims," as
stipulated in article 53(1)(c) of the Rome Statute.
V. CONCLUSION
The work of the ICC can have effects on ongoing conflicts like the one in
Darfur. As a result of its permanent character, the ICC is able to react more
quickly than ad hoc tribunals vis-hi-vis an unfolding conflict and therefore
represents a constant threat to potential perpetrators worldwide. The Court also
commits international criminal justice to a new task, namely to deal with
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ongoing mass atrocities. The main challenge of the ad hoc tribunals has been
to deliver post-conflict justice; one of the main challenges of the ICC will be
to have beneficial effects on ongoing conflicts.
Dealing with the Darfur conflict is and will remain a difficult and complex
issue for the ICC. Although the Court could have reacted more quickly after its
activation through the Security Council referral in order to have a more
immediate impact on the conflict, it must also proceed with awareness of
possible damaging consequences. By issuing arrest warrants against Ahmad
Harun, a member of the GoS, and Ali Kushayb, a militia leader, the ICC began
to genuinely influence the conflict in Darfur. Although the GoS continues to
reject ICC jurisdiction over crimes committed on its territory and will probably
not change its non-cooperative policy towards the ICC in the near future, the
indictments have had political effects; Sudanese officials have clearly become
more nervous. The impact of the ICC could, however, be more substantial.
Even though it is unlikely that those most responsible for the crimes committed
in Darfur can be incapacitated by ICC indictments in the near future, the ICC
can stigmatize political and military leaders. As a result, the ICC activity is
likely to influence the upcoming elections in 2009, thus forcing Khartoum to
change its Darfur policy.
Despite these desirable possible effects, the ICC must proceed carefully
until it can benefit from unconditional support of the international community,
and particularly as long as the position of the GoS is strong enough to block or
substantially delay the deployment of a peacekeeping mission. At the moment,
the international community, including the ICC, should mainly be concerned
about the successful deployment of thejoint U.N.-AU mission. The Court must
not be blind on the political eye and endanger a peacekeeping mission, which
would clearly not be in the interests of the victims in Darfur. Under the current
circumstances, meetings of OTP staff with representatives of the U.N. and the
AU 185 send the unhelpful signal to the GoS that the OTP will effectively try to
cooperate as much as possible with a peacekeeping mission. However, once
basic security can be guaranteed, the ICC will be able to act more freely.
Although the deployment of a peacekeeping mission is of utmost
importance, it will not bring about a political solution for Darfur. In the course
of renegotiating the Darfur Peace Agreement, holding individuals criminally
responsible in The Hague will also become an issue. It is important that the
185. The ICC Deputy Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, met with the U.N. Deputy Secretary General,
Asha-Rose Migiro, and with Ambassador Pascal Gayama, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Congo
to the U.N. and President of the Security Council for the month of August in 2007, to discuss the cooperation
of the U.N. and other organizations with the Court as well as the need to enforce the Court's decisions. See
Press Release, International Criminal Court, Deputy Prosecutor of the ICC to meet U.N. Deputy Secretary
General and President of U.N. Security Council (Aug. 17, 2007), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/press/pressreleases/265.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2008).
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OTP avoids becoming a bargaining chip for various players during these peace
negotiations. Following the concept of the initial proportion strategy, the OTP
should target individuals of all sides of the conflict. As a consequence,
addressing the question of cooperating with the Court would become inevitable
for the GoS and the militia leaders as well as for the rebel leaders. This would
significantly strengthen the credibility and the political weight of the ICC.
Under the current circumstances, a successful scenario, including the
enforcement of arrest warrants and the surrender of Sudanese indictees to The
Hague, is only conceivable if and when the advocates of international criminal
justice will be able to exercise enough political pressure on the GoS to make
cooperation with the ICC unavoidable. Since China began to pressure the GoS
towards more international cooperation, tougher measures, such as political or
economic sanctions, have become a realistic threat for Khartoum in case of non-
compliance with its international obligations.
It seems that the ICC will have to break a circle. If the ICC does not
receive the necessary support from the international community, it will not be
powerful enough to effectively target high political leaders; but if the Court
does not make a meaningful step, some important political players, such as
permanent members of the Security Council or the AU, will not seriously take
into consideration the possible contribution of the ICC to bring peace to the
region. Therefore, more individuals will have to be targeted, including rebel
leaders and higher government officials in Khartoum. Sooner or later, the GoS
will have to "sacrifice" at least the Minister of State for Humanitarian Affairs,
Ahmad Harun. Unfortunately, trying those most responsible for the inter-
national crimes committed in Darfur will not be possible in the short run but
only after a regime change in Khartoum. I"6
More generally, international support for the ICC is crucial, above all by
the permanent members of the Security Council, in order to increase the
effectiveness of the Court. The Security Council has the power to determine
that the refusal of a national government to cooperate with the ICC represents
a threat to international peace and security, thus ensuring the enforcement of
ICC requests for cooperation and arrest warrants. With this political support,
the ICC will become a significant player when the international community
faces situations of mass atrocities, therefore successfully developing into "an
instrument for maintaining international peace and security by the pursuit of
justice." '187
186. In this context, it is interesting to note that Sudan already has experience with trials of former
political figures. The leaders of the 1969 coup, including Colonel Jaafar al-Nineiri, were successfully
prosecuted during the 1985-86 transitional period for overthrowing a democratically elected government.
See Yoanes Ajawin, Human Rights Violations and Transitional Justice, in THE PHOENIX STATE: CIVIL
SOCIETY AND THE FUTURE OF SUDAN 113, 121 (A.H. Abdel Salam & Alex de Waal eds., 2001).
187. McGoldrick, supra note 8, at 471.
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However, there is an important caveat: the ICC should not be used as a fig
leaf by the international community. In the case of Darfur, the Security Council
seemed to consider the ICC referral as a "halfway measure from the
humanitarian military intervention."' 88 If more stringent measures, such as
political or economic sanctions or, as a last resort, a military intervention, are
urgently needed to halt mass atrocities, the ICC activity cannot be used as an
excuse by the international community not to take action.
The Darfur conflict has shown that the international community, including
the ICC, must urgently increase its efforts to be able to deal with mass atrocities
without delay. The analysis of the ICC involvement in the situation of Darfur
should also be helpful to determine a generally valid, constructive approach of
international criminal justice regarding future armed conflicts and in bello
justice.
188. Nsongurua J. Udombana, Pay Back Time in Sudan? Darfur and the International Criminal
Court, 13 TJL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 55 (2006).
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